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INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
AND NORTH KOREA: ANOTHER ANGLE 
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
MORSE TAN* 
Throughout the last twenty years, the international focus on North 
Korea has predominantly been on its security issues while there is a 
paucity of scholarship exploring the legal implications of North Korea’s 
grave human rights violations.  This Article attempts to bridge this void 
through international humanitarian law, which applies to North Korea’s 
continued hostilities and defiance on the Korean peninsula and around 
the world. 
This Article further analyzes international law in relation to North 
Korea’s repeated irresponsible military provocations against South 
Korea, the United States, and the world.  It looks at such actions through 
an international humanitarian law lens, which no other scholar has 
explored in this way, and presents a new paradigm in which the world’s 
most serious international crisis (security combined with human rights) 
can be evaluated. 
 
*  Professor Tan is an Associate Professor of Law (with tenure) at Northern Illinois 
University College of Law.  He was a Supreme Court Fellow Finalist and previously served as 
a visiting Scholar and Senior Research Fellow at the University of Texas School of Law.  
Professor Tan would like to thank the scholars that have taken the time to give helpful 
feedback on this Article, in particular Professor Antonio Perez, Professor Mark Cordes, and 
Professor Christopher Hines.  For special recognition, Professor Robert Jones and Dr. Son, 
Gi-Woong, a leading North Korea scholar, gave the most extensive feedback.  Kevin 
Zickterman, his former RA and now an AmeriCorps VISTA Attorney at the Legal 
Assistance Foundation (LAF), played the most indispensable part in the Article.  Indeed, if it 
were not for his research and other contributions, this Article would not have been possible.  
Amanda Beveroth and Jeremy McCabe, prior RA’s as well, contributed significantly.  Sonya 
Chung, Weston Sedgwick, and Sarah Walsh also assisted in the Article.  Please note that this 
Article is merely one piece in the complex North Korean puzzle.  Its goal is to follow the prior 
three companion articles in the series, which respectively analyzed the security crisis, the 
massive international human rights horrors within North Korea, and the options for future 
redress of such issues through various international tribunals.  Therefore, this Article would 
best be read in tandem with each of the companion articles in the series.  This series of 
Articles provided a foundation for the book North Korea, International Law and the Dual 
Crises: Narrative and Constructive Engagement, published by Routledge Press in April, 2015. 
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By analyzing the Korean Armistice Agreement, armistice law, and 
inter-Korean agreements over the last several decades, this Article will 
explain major legal implications of the ongoing Korean War.  This Article 
not only argues that North Korea has perpetuated the Korean conflict 
through continued hostilities and belligerent behavior, but also that North 
Korea has committed, and continues to commit, rampant violations of 
international humanitarian law principles. 
This Article chronicles yet another angle of North Korea’s defiance of 
international law and provides a starting point for future prosecution of 
Kim Jong-Un, as well as other responsible leaders.  Building on prior 
articles, this Article seeks relief for a devastated population living in 
hunger, fear, and horrendous injustices.   
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But more than the litany of crimes committed against South 
Koreans or the kidnapping of Japanese citizens or the axe-
murder of UN guards in the Demilitarized Zone, more than the 
macabre nature of the North Korean regime which allows its 
citizens to starve to death by the hundreds of thousands while 
pouring in one-third of its GDP into the military, more than the 
habitual violations of international agreements and the 
predictable pattern of blackmail and willful deceit that has 
always underlain North Korean diplomacy, there is a basic 
irrefutable fact that shows that North Korea always has been and 
remains to this day a grave threat to South Korea’s national 
security and to peace in the region.  It is North Korea’s explicitly 
stated national goal as enshrined in the preamble of its Korean 
Workers’ Party Rules and in its Constitution and repeated over 
and over again by the various channels of state propaganda 
machinery: “Liberate the South and bring about the complete 
victory of socialism on the fatherland.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
July 27, 1953, marked a momentous date in Korean history.  The 
signing of the Korean Armistice on that date not only marked an official 
cessation of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, it also represented the 
end of the first wide-scale use of UN military forces and the first joint 
military response of UN member states.2  Found within this historic 
ceasefire agreement between the belligerent parties lies a promise that a 
permanent peace treaty would soon be signed between the UN forces 
and the Korean People’s Army and China.3  That promise was not kept, 
as negotiations for a political conference between the parties to resolve 
this and other matters on the peninsula fell apart by mid-1954.4  Since 
that time, Korea has teetered on the brink of resuming all-out war, with 
a communist north and a democratic south separated only by the 
 
1.  Sung-Yoon Lee, Nuclear Diplomacy vis-à-vis the DPRK: A Dead-End Street, 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 2003, at 151, 156–57. 
2.  See Scott R. Morris, America’s Most Recent Prisoner of War: The Warrant Officer 
Bobby Hall Incident, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1996, at 3, 3–4; Samuel Pollack, The Korean 
Armistice: Collective Security in Suspense, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1984, at 43, 43. 
3.  Military Armistice in Korea and Temporary Supplementary Agreement, art. IV, July 
27, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 234, 260 [hereinafter Korean Armistice]. 
4.  David M. Morriss, From War to Peace: A Study of Cease-Fire Agreements and the 
Evolving Role of the United Nations, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 801, 885 (1996). 
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Demilitarized Zone, a mere 2.5 miles wide, part of the most militarized 
border in the world. 
Since that day in 1953, dozens of scholars have written about both 
the momentous Korean Armistice and the joint UN military effort in 
Korea.  Some of these scholars have recognized that the Korean War is 
anything but over.5  Unfortunately, with the exception of those scholars 
that have focused on North Korea’s proliferation defiance and 
withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),6 not enough 
attention has been devoted to articulate the consequences of North 
Korea’s actions as part of the ongoing Korean War.  North Korea’s 
ongoing hostilities open it to application of international humanitarian 
law standards, which may factor into future prosecution, as this author 
and the UN Commission of Inquiry recommend.   
This Article presents a starting point to fill these lacunae and 
highlight international law consequences of a continued international 
armed conflict on the Korean peninsula.  It will primarily focus on 
North Korea’s numerous actions of military aggression aimed at several 
nations around the globe and probe whether the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK) in performing such actions has been 
violating international humanitarian law (IHL—also known as the laws 
of war or the law of armed conflict).  Part II of this Article will provide a 
background to this issue by analyzing the Korean Armistice agreement, 
armistice law, and the many inter-Korean agreements that exemplify the 
two Koreas’ policies and priorities regarding the continuing Korean 
conflict.   
Part III will discuss the applicable international law framework to 
this continued conflict.  This Part will argue that under this 
framework—which includes a number of treaties, conventions, 
customary international law, and other sources of the laws of armed 
conflict and portions of international human rights law (IHR)—the 
Korean conflict and the actions of North Korea can be approached 
under the paradigm of international humanitarian law.  Part IV 
continues this analysis by demonstrating that, in applying binding 
 
5.  See, e.g., Morris, supra note 2, at 14 (“In sum, the armistice in effect on the Korean 
peninsula has not ended the state of war between North Korea and the nations under the 
United Nations/United States command and their respective allies.”). 
6.  See, e.g., Antonio F. Perez, Survival of Rights Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty: Withdrawal and the Continuing Right of International Atomic Energy Agency 
Safeguards, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 749 (1994) (persuasively arguing that North Korea bears 
responsibility for its violations of the safeguards provisions while it remained under the NPT). 
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international humanitarian law principles to such actions, the DPRK has 
maintained a system of violations and continues to remain liable for 
most of these violations since the signing of the armistice.  This Article 
continues to build upon the framework of several companion articles 
underscoring the mass violations of international law systematically 
perpetrated by the DPRK and constructing a forum for possible 
prosecution of the state’s leaders. 
II. THE KOREAN WAR AND THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT 
On March 7, 2013, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a 
new round of economic sanctions against North Korea through a 
strongly worded resolution.7  This resolution, recalling the 2006 and 
2009 resolutions that implemented similar sanctions on the DPRK, 
responded to yet another nuclear test performed by North Korea on 
February 12, 2013.8  Resolution 2094 bears great significance for two 
reasons: (1) the resolution was partially drafted by the Republic of 
China, North Korea’s closest ally;9 and more importantly, (2) North 
Korea threatened again to “withdraw” or otherwise not abide by the 
armistice agreement.10  Four days later, on March 11, 2013, the North 
Korean state newspaper claimed that the nation did just that.11  
Why would a country like North Korea promulgate such a 
withdrawal?  Why would a state like North Korea, a state that has 
repeatedly and egregiously violated every international agreement it has 
made,12 engage in such defiance?  One answer may be that it is the 
largest chip that North Korea has left as political leverage for its 
repeated pattern of brinkmanship, already having allegedly withdrawn 
from the NPT.13  Another likely reason resonates with the topic of this 
 
7.  S.C. Res. 2094, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2094 (Mar. 7, 2013); Edith M. Lederer & Hyung-Jin 
Kim, UN Approves New Sanctions Against North Korea, ALASKA J. COM. (Mar. 7, 2013, 9:37 
AM), http://www.alaskajournal.com/Alaska-Journal-of-Commerce/March-Issue-2-2013/UN-
approves-new-sanctions-against-North-Korea/, archived at http://perma.cc/USR2-25MA. 
8.  S.C. Res. 2094, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1, 5; Lederer & Kim, supra note 7. 
9.  Lederer & Kim, supra note 7. 
10.  Hyung-Jin Kim & Foster Klug, North Korea Says It Cancels 1953 Armistice, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 11, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/north-korea-says-cancels-
1953-armistice-172852036.html, archived at http://perma.cc/UP3L-ZQRK. 
11.  Id.  
12.  See, e.g., Morse H. Tan, Finding a Forum for North Korea, 65 SMU L. REV. 765 
passim (2012) [hereinafter Tan, Finding a Forum]. 
13.  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1874, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009) (one of the 
many Security Council resolutions demanding “that the DPRK immediately retract its 
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Article: North Korea knows that the Korean War has not reached its 
conclusion and the armistice stands as a roadblock to resumption of full-
scale war on the peninsula14—a war that might yield more than a million 
casualties.15 
A. The Background and Scope of the Korean Armistice Agreement 
June 25, 1950, marked the beginning of a massive invasion by North 
Korean soldiers over the 38th parallel and the official beginning of the 
Korean War.16  In an unprecedented move, the newly created UN 
Security Council approved its first resolution to establish a UN coalition 
of armed forces to repel this war of aggression on July 7, 1950.17  
Through the next three years, sixteen member state forces, led by the 
United States military, fought North Korean forces, driving them to the 
Yalu River on the border of the Republic of China within just a few 
months.18  Soon after this push, an influx of Chinese forces aided the 
North Korean forces, repelling the UN coalition back to the 38th 
parallel, where the fighting continued for two years.19  After three years 
of bloodshed and two years of negotiations near the village of 
Panmunjom, the “longest, most violated military armistice in modern 
history,” the Korean Armistice Agreement, took shape.20 
As mentioned above, the DPRK recently announced that it would 
no longer adhere to the armistice agreement, which it now considers 
 
announcement of withdrawal from the NPT”); Frederic L. Kirgis, North Korea’s Withdrawal 
from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, INSIGHTS (Jan. 24, 2003), http://www.asil.org/insigh
ts/volume/8/issue/2/north-koreas-withdrawal-nuclear-nonproliferation-treaty, archived at http:
//perma.cc/MB3Q-H4V8 (explaining North Korea’s alleged withdrawal from the NPT on 
January 10, 2003). 
14.  Morriss, supra note 4, at 885, 887 (“The Korean Armistice has prevented renewed 
large-scale hostilities for over forty years . . . .  Despite the breakdown of some of its major 
provisions, the Armistice has been durable enough to withstand failures and violations and to 
prevent the eruption of another full-scale war on the Korean peninsula.”). 
15.  Morse Tan, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Past Failures, Present Solutions, 50 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 517, 525–26 (2006) [hereinafter Tan, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis] 
(explaining that military strategists claim that a full-scale North Korean invasion could 
produce over one million casualties).  
16.  Pollack, supra note 2, at 44–45.  
17.  S.C. Res. 84, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1588 (July 7, 1950); Pollack, supra note 2, at 45. 
18.  Pollack, supra note 2, at 45. 
19.  Id.; Tan, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis, supra note 15, at 521. 
20.  Pollack, supra note 2, at 43; Morris, supra note 2, at 4; Tan, The North Korean 
Nuclear Crisis, supra note 15, at 521. 
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void.21  However, the armistice itself specifically prohibits such an 
announcement.  Article V (Paragraph 62) states that “[t]he Articles and 
Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until 
expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and 
additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful 
settlement at a political level between both sides.”22  Unilateral 
withdrawal breaks its own terms, and on its face, supersession—not 
violation or withdrawal—appears to be the only tool by which the 
armistice’s precedent can be “undone.”  Further, the agreement 
specifically states that its provisions apply to all ground, naval, and air 
forces of both sides so that the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and those 
territories under the military control of the other are adequately 
respected.23  Not only must each military commander ensure that 
subordinates who violate the armistice are “adequately punished,” the 
responsibility for such compliance and enforcement remains in the 
hands of the signatories and their successors.24  Moreover,  
The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within 
their respective commands all measures and procedures 
necessary to insure complete compliance with all of the 
provisions hereof by all elements of their commands.  They shall 
actively cooperate with one another and with the Military 
Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission in requiring observance of both the letter and the 
spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.25 
As further explained below, such cooperation from the North has not 
transpired, and its defiance under this agreement commenced shortly 
after signing it.26 
The armistice clearly states its prohibitions of any acts of war by 
either side.  Article I stresses that parties may not “execute any hostile 
act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone,” and that no 
persons, military or civilian, may enter the DMZ, let alone cross it, 
 
21.  Kim & Klug, supra note 10. 
22.  Korean Armistice, supra note 3, art. V (emphasis added). 
23.  Id. art II. 
24.  Id. 
25.  Id. (emphasis added). 
26.  See, e.g., DICK K. NANTO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30004, NORTH KOREA: 
CHRONOLOGY OF PROVOCATIONS, 1950–2003, at 3 (2003) (detailing the hijacking of a South 
Korean airliner by North Korean agents less than five years after the signing of the armistice); 
see also discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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“unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice 
Commission.”27  Article II clarifies that a complete cessation of 
hostilities take place 12 hours after the signing of the Armistice 
Agreement, providing no exceptions for violations or encumbrances of 
the DMZ.28  Neither a derogation clause nor other reserved right to 
withdraw or violate its provisions pending state emergency or other 
state interests exists.   
Most importantly for our discussion, in addition to providing a 
comprehensive repatriation system for prisoners of war after the 
cessation of hostilities and the allowance of displaced civilians to 
temporarily cross the DMZ,29  Article IV of the agreement presents the 
building blocks of this Article.  Article IV had recommended that within 
three months of the signing of the armistice a political conference would 
“be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through 
negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.”30  This 
peaceful settlement negotiation and treaty never materialized, 
exhibiting the lamentable fact that both sides remain at war because of 
the armistice’s provisions.31  We now turn to discuss armistice law and 
the Korean armistice agreement. 
B. Armistice Law  
With a majority of scholars, the inquiry stops there.  However, some 
military scholars have discussed the significance of the armistice’s 
application to the situation under customary international law and 
armistice law,32 and their insight weighs heavily to make international 
humanitarian law applicable to North Korea’s actions since 1953.  These 
scholars have pointed out that the armistice required a cessation of 
hostilities but may not have brought an end to a state of war in the 
region.33  An armistice, in sum, brings only a temporary peace;34 a peace 
treaty formalizes an end of a war.35 
 
27.  Korean Armistice, supra note 3, art. I. 
28.  Id. art. II. 
29.  Id. art. IV. 
30.  Id. at 260.  
31.  See Morris, supra note 2, at 12–13. 
32.  E.g., Ernest A. Simon, The Operation of the Korean Armistice Agreement, 47 MIL. 
L. REV. 105 (1970).  
33.  E.g., Morris, supra note 2, at 12 (“Within twelve hours of the signing of the 
Armistice Agreement at 1000, 27 July 1953, hostilities on the Korean peninsula were 
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These authors’ concepts emanate from The Hague Conventions and 
The Law of Land Warfare and have attained customary international 
law status.36  For example, Article 36 of the Hague Convention (No. II) 
With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land explicitly states 
that “[a]n armistice suspends military operations by mutual agreement 
between the belligerent parties.  If its duration is not fixed, the 
belligerent parties can resume operations at any time, provided always 
the enemy is warned within the time agreed upon, in accordance with 
the terms of the armistice.”37  Although the Korean Armistice does not 
expressly allow for recommencing of hostilities due to an intentional and 
serious breach of the agreement, Article 40 of this Hague Convention 
permits a belligerent party to denounce a serious violation of the 
armistice by another party and recommence hostilities immediately, if 
the situation presents any urgency.38 
At least one scholar has traced this armistice law back to ancient 
Greece and Rome, where an armistice or truce (an indutiae) did not 
terminate the condition of war between parties like a treaty of peace 
 
supposed to cease.  However, that did not mean that the state of war on the peninsula 
ceased.”); Simon, supra note 32, at 106 (“If the customary rules governing armistice are 
resorted to, the parties are technically still in a state of war, de facto and de jure, and the 
international law of war applies insofar as it is not displaced by the Armistice Agreement or 
the customary rules of armistice.” (footnote omitted)). 
34.  Morris, supra note 2, at 13.  
35.  Id.; Simon, supra note 32, at 109 (“The end in view is always the treaty of peace by 
means of which the relations between belligerent nations pass from a state of war to a state of 
peace.”).  Although a Vienna-style peace through a bilateral treaty would be preferred to 
permanently end the conflict, the objective of this Article is not to discuss a preferred method 
of peace but simply to explore the means by which international humanitarian law can be 
applied to the North Korean situation. 
36.  See, e.g., Simon, supra note 32, at 108–09, 124–27. 
37.  Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 36, July 29, 
1899, 32 Stat. 1803 [hereinafter Hague Convention II] (emphasis added); see also INST. OF 
INT’L LAW, Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 5 (Sept. 9, 1880), in RESOLUTIONS OF 
THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW DEALING WITH THE LAW OF NATIONS 25 (James 
Brown Scott ed. & trans., 1916) (“Military conventions made between belligerents during the 
continuance of war, such as armistices and capitulations, must be scrupulously observed and 
respected.” (emphasis added)). 
38.  Hague Convention II, supra note 37, art. 40.  These customary provisions found in 
the Hague Conventions were primarily and previously taken from Articles 47–52 of the 
Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War.  Project of 
an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, arts. 47–52, August 
27, 1874, in 1 SUPP. AM. J. INT’L L. 96 (1907) [hereinafter Conference of Brussels]. 
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(the foedus).39  Contemporary writers and modern military teachings 
have reflected this concept, and there is little indication that such law 
has changed over the last sixty years.40  Simon expresses the contrary 
view that the armistice and Korea’s unique situation bypass this 
customary rule and that the provisions of the armistice have little 
application to the current military and political status of the peninsula.41  
However, this conclusion emerged at the beginning of continued 
provocations by North Korea in the region42 and well before the 
contracting parties agreed to the numerous inter-Korean and other 
agreements.  These agreements and more contemporary events receive 
further analysis below.   
C. Inter-Korean and Related International Agreements and Statements  
Although North Korea’s actions have expressed contempt for the 
armistice, “neither a new war nor a true peace has emerged to replace 
it.”43  Rather, the many concessions and agreements that North Korea 
has signed with various states support the contention that an 
international armed conflict still exists and that North Korea knows and 
understands that this state of war continues intact.   
For example, the second principle of unification as pronounced in 
the North–South Joint Statement of 1972 states that any unification 
 
39.  Howard S. Levie, The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement, 50 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 880, 885 (1956). 
40.  See id.  Colonel Levie uses the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
1918 Armistice from World War I and a French Court of Cassation’s 1944 case to 
demonstrate that courts around the time of the Korean Armistice interpreted armistice law 
consistent with the Greeks and Romans.  Id. 
41.  Simon, supra note 32, at 136 (“The customary rules of international law governing 
armistice status, insofar as they allow a resumption of hostilities, are no longer relevant to the 
present situation in Korea.  This conclusion emerged from an analysis of the military and 
political conditions under which the armistice was concluded, the nature of the Armistice 
Agreement, the settlement of disputes arising during the armistice, and the practice of both 
sides in dealing with specific incidents.”). 
42.  Parts III and IV will highlight North Korea’s pattern of hostilities, a pattern that is 
so widespread that over 124 provocations were recorded from the beginning of the Korean 
war to March 2003 and many more in the years to follow.  See generally EMMA CHANLETT-
AVERY, MARK E. MANYIN & HANNAH FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33389, 
NORTH KOREA: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN 2005 (2006) [hereinafter CHANLETT-
AVERY ET AL.]; MARK E. MANYIN, EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY & HELENE MARCHART, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32743, NORTH KOREA: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, 
OCTOBER 2002–DECEMBER 2004 (2005) [hereinafter MANYIN ET AL.]; NANTO, supra 
note 26. 
43.  Morriss, supra note 4, at 887. 
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should occur “peacefully without the use of military force[].”44  North 
and South Korea expressly agreed that each side would “implement 
appropriate measures to stop military provocation[s] which may lead to 
unintended armed conflicts.”45  One concrete means to address this 
problem—still in use today even as North Korea proclaims to have 
voided the armistice—was to establish direct phone lines between Seoul 
and Pyongyang to prevent accidental military clashes.46  As history has 
shown, this preventative measure has proven relatively unsuccessful, 
considering that less than two years later, in February of 1974, North 
Korean patrol vessels sank two South Korean fishing boats and detained 
thirty fishermen.47  The agreement as a whole proved to be no more 
than empty words, as six months after this incident Park Chung Hee’s 
wife (i.e., the Republic of Korea’s First Lady at that time) died in an 
assassination attempt on her husband’s life by an agent of a pro-North 
Korean group from Japan.48 
Twenty years later, through the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-
Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North 
in December of 1991, the Koreas again wrote their concerns for the 
peninsula.49  In addition to agreeing that the parties should refrain from 
acts of sabotage and insurrection by the terms of Article IV, Article V 
states that both the North and South would “endeavor together to 
transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace 
between the South and the North and shall abide by the present Military 
Armistice Agreement (of July 27, 1953) until such a state of peace [is] 
. . . realized.”50  The agreement continues to forbid armed aggression or 
force between the parties and requires peaceful resolution of disputes.51  
In addition to reiterating in Article 13 the need for a phone line—
 
44.  July  4th  North−South  Joint  Statement,  N. Kor.-S. Kor.  (July  4,  1972),  http://ww
w2.law.columbia.edu/course_00S_L9436_001/North%20Korea%20materials/74js-en.htm (last 
visited May 20, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FL6R-2NK4. 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. 
47.  NANTO, supra note 26, at 6. 
48.  Id. 
49.  See Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation 
between the South and the North, N. Kor.-S. Kor., Dec. 13, 1991, available at http://peacemak
er.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KR%20KP_911213_Agreement%20on%20reconciliat
ion%20non%20aggression%20and%20exchangespdf.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UED3-
S6QD. 
50.  Id. arts. 4–5. 
51.  Id. art. 9. 
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supposedly established previously—between military authorities to 
avoid accidental armed clashes, Articles 12 and 14 looked to establish a 
South–North Joint Military Commission and a South–North Military 
Sub-Committee in order to achieve “phased reductions in armaments 
including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and attack 
capabilities,” as well as to help “remove military confrontation” 
between the parties.52  However, not more than three months after these 
agreements, three agents of the DPRK in South Korean uniforms were 
shot dead at Cholwon, Kangwondo, just south of the DMZ.53 
Also at this time, the Koreas signed the Joint Declaration of South 
and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 
which declared that neither Korea would use nuclear weapons and that 
nuclear capabilities would find only peaceful purposes.54  In even more 
blatant defiance of these two agreements, a mere year after signing 
both, North Korea announced its first attempt at withdrawal from the 
NPT.55 
Five years after the June of 2000 North–South Declaration, which 
capitalized upon each Korea’s willingness to reunite families separated 
by the Korean conflict and settle unconverted long-term prisoners and 
other humanitarian issues,56 the two Koreas signed the Joint Statement 
of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks.57  
This latter statement and the Six-Party Talks in general aimed to 
denuclearize the Korean Peninsula again through peaceful terms.  
Beyond the aforementioned Denuclearization agreement, in which the 
DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing 
nuclear programs and returning to the NPT and IAEA safeguards, it 
 
52.  Id. arts. 12–14. 
53.  NANTO, supra note 26, at 11. 
54.  Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, N. Kor-S. Kor, Jan. 
20, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 569, as available at http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptkoreanuc.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/T6JG-LP6W. 
55.  Brooke Milton & Gaurav Kampani, IAEA–North Korea: Nuclear Safeguards and 
Inspections 1993, JAMES MARTIN CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, http://cns.miis.ed
u/archive/country_north_korea/nuc/iaea93.htm (last visited May 21, 2015), archived at http://p
erma.cc/TD8U-6UE8. 
56.  See South−North Joint Declaration, N. Kor.-S. Kor., June 15, 2000, available at http:
//www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/n_skorea061520
00.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F9PH-45TL. 
57.  Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFF. OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Sept. 19, 2005), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_
eng/topics_665678/dslbj_665832/t212707.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/SCF8-RPSE. 
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also asseverated that the parties would “negotiate a permanent peace 
regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.”58  
Yet even during the time between the North–South Declaration and 
these Six-Party Talks, North Korea still test-fired missiles.59  
Furthermore, just a year after this Six-Party Talk Joint Statement, North 
Korea attempted to test yet another long-range missile, prompting UN 
Security Council Resolution 1695, which condemned the tests.60 
North Korea understands the current state of war on the peninsula.  
The Inter-Korean Summit Agreement of October 2007 clearly restates 
this status.61  This agreement reiterates the same commitment by both 
sides—that each would work together to end military hostilities and 
tensions to guarantee peace; however, it also stated that  
[t]he South and the North both recognize the need to end the 
current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime.  
The South and the North have also agreed to work together to 
advance the matter of having the leaders of the three or four 
parties directly concerned to convene on the Peninsula and 
declare an end to the war.62 
In 2011, the United States Congress acknowledged the fact that the 
Korean conflict has not ended and that North Korea must abide by IHL 
standards, at least in terms of prisoners of war and abductees.63  Yet 
 
58.  Id. 
59.  CHANLETT-AVERY ET AL., supra note 42, at 15, 20, 22.  
60.  S.C. Res. 1695, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006); A Timeline of North Korea’s 
Nuclear Development, ACDIS, http://acdis.illinois.edu/resources/arms-control-quick-facts/tim
eline-of-north-koreas-nuclear-development.html (last visited May 21, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/FRC9-97KK. 
61.  October   4   Inter-Korean   Summit   Agreement,   DAILYNK.COM,  http://www.daily
nk.com/english/db_info.php?db_name=October%204%20Inter-Korean%20Summit%20Agre
ement (last visited May 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/A3Z9-JRAQ. 
62.  Id. (emphasis added). 
63.  See H.R. Res. 376, 112th Cong. (2011) (“Whereas 58 years have passed after the 
signing of the ceasefire agreement at Panmunjom on July 27, 1953, and the peninsula still 
technically remains in a state of war; . . . the House of Representatives . . . encourages North 
Korea to repatriate any American and South Korean POWs to their home countries to 
reunite with their families under the International Humanitarian Law set forth in the Geneva 
Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War; . . . calls upon North Korea to agree 
to the family reunions and immediate repatriation of the abductees under the International 
Humanitarian Law set forth in the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War.”). 
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only two years after the 2007 agreement, North Korea did not stop test-
firing missiles but conducted yet another illegal nuclear test.64 
Thus, the Korean War has not ended—as indicated by North or 
South Korea’s agreement, treaty, or the Korean Armistice.  The 
question remains whether this conflict has ended under the law of 
armed conflict or IHL.  A resounding “no” emerges to this question—
this established portion of international law accurately applies to North 
Korea’s actions.   
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 
Although the laws of war have continued through thousands of years 
of armed conflict and find themselves fixed into the framework of 
customary international law, several treaties and conventions signed by 
the majority of the world’s nations have codified the law in this area.  
This treaty law, particularly the Geneva Conventions, to which the 
DPRK itself agreed, constitutes a solid starting point for assessing 
whether such laws of war actually apply to the actions of the DPRK 
since signing the armistice.   
A. The Geneva Conventions and Their Protocols 
The DPRK agreed to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 on 
August 27, 1957, and the Conventions’ provisions came into effect on 
February 27, 1958.65  Ironically, a mere week and a half earlier, North 
Korean agents hijacked a South Korean plane en route to Seoul.66  
North Korea later acceded to the Conventions’ first protocol on March 
 
64.  A Timeline of North Korea’s Nuclear Development, supra note 60. 
65.  Accession to Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Aug. 27, 1957, 278 U.N.T.S. 262 (entered into force Feb. 27, 1958); Accession to 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 27, 1957, 278 
U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into force Feb. 27, 1958); Accession to Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, Aug. 27, 1957, 278 U.N.T.S. 260 (entered into force Feb. 27, 1958); Accession 
to Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 27, 1957, 278 U.N.T.S. 259 (entered into force Feb. 27, 1958). 
66.  NANTO, supra note 26, at 3.  The hijacking took place on February 16, 1958.  North 
Korean Agents Hijacked a South Korean DC-3 Airliner, THIS WEEK IN USAF & PACAF 
HIST. (U.S. Air Force), Feb. 16−22, 2009, at 2, http://www.pacaf.af.mil/shared/media/documen
t/AFD-090218-081.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VY6U-VNU3.  This hijacking was separate 
from the hijacking that took place in December of 1969. 
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9, 1988, and its provisions came into effect on September 9, 1988.67  The 
significance of these dates crystallizes when discussing these treaties’ 
application to the DPRK’s actions, but they demonstrate that North 
Korea has been a party to each for quite some time and hence should be 
aware of their applicability and relevance. 
This analysis starts with Common Article 2 of the Geneva 
Conventions; Article 2 of each convention states: 
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in 
peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of 
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one of them.68 
Even though this language appears quite broad on its face, 
interpretation and applicability of its words have proven even broader.  
The Commentary to the Geneva Conventions clarifies how this article 
relates to the Conventions’ applicability in the context of armed 
conflicts: 
There is no need for a formal declaration of war, or for 
recognition of the existence of a state of war, as preliminaries to 
the application of the Convention.  The occurrence of de facto 
hostilities is sufficient. . . .  Any difference arising between two 
States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed 
forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if 
one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war.  It makes 
no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter 
takes place.  The respect due to the human person as such is not 
measured by the number of victims.  Nor, incidentally, does the 
application of the Convention necessarily involve the 
intervention of cumbrous machinery.69 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reaffirmed 
this understanding of how a mere resort to arms by two states triggers 
 
67.  Accession to Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Mar. 
9, 1988, 1513 U.N.T.S. 492 (entered into force Sept. 9, 1988). 
68.  E.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).  
69.  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: II GENEVA CONVENTION FOR 
THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED 
MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES AT SEA 28 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) (emphasis added). 
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an international armed conflict (IAC) as well as the Conventions’ 
applicability.70 Citing the Conventions’ commentary, the ICRC stated: 
An IAC occurs when one or more States have recourse to armed 
force against another State, regardless of the reasons or the 
intensity of this confrontation.  Relevant rules of IHL may be 
applicable even in the absence of open hostilities.  Moreover, no 
formal declaration of war or recognition of the situation is 
required.  The existence of an IAC, and as a consequence, the 
possibility to apply International Humanitarian Law to this 
situation, depends on what actually happens on the ground.  It is 
based on factual conditions.71 
The ICRC adopted the opinion of the scholars D. Schindler and H.P. 
Gasser: that an international armed conflict comes into existence and 
triggers the conventions’ applicability under this Article as soon as one 
State employs any armed force against another.72 
North Korea on dozens of occasions—ranging from shooting down 
aircraft, infiltrating South Korea and killing its soldiers, government 
officials and citizens, sinking fishing and patrol boats, bombing military 
and civilian targets, and participating in gun battles at sea around the 
Korean peninsula—has resorted to and instigated armed conflict with 
South Korea and other nations, including the United States.73  
Therefore, under this definition, an international armed conflict still 
presently exists in Korea and applies to North Korea’s actions from 1958 
onward. 
The first Protocol to the Geneva Conventions offers similar 
applicability, suggesting that its added protections apply to North 
 
70.  See generally How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International 
Humanitarian Law? 1 (Mar. 2008) [hereinafter ICRC Opinion Paper], http://www.icrc.org/eng
/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/5E66-D3QN. 
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. at 2 (citing Hans Haug with Hans-Peter Gasser, International Humanitarian Law, 
in HANS HAUG ET AL., HUMANITY FOR ALL: THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED 
CRESCENT MOVEMENT 491, 510–11 (1993); Dietrich Schindler, The Different Types of 
Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, in 163 THE 
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 117, 131 
(1979)). 
73.  See, for example, the United States’ Congressional Research Service’s many sources 
for a timeline of all such provocations from 1950 to early 2007.  CHANLETT-AVERY ET AL., 
supra note 42, passim; HANNAH FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30004, NORTH 
KOREAN PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS, 1950–2007 passim (2007); MANYIN ET AL., supra note 42, 
passim; NANTO, supra note 26, passim. 
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Korea’s actions as well.  Under Article 1, Protocol 1 supplements the 
Geneva Conventions and thus applies in every situation that falls under 
Common Article 2 above.74  The Protocol’s Commentary reinforces this 
interpretation as well by stating that 
humanitarian law also covers any dispute between two States 
involving the use of their armed forces.  Neither the duration of 
the conflict, nor its intensity, play[s] a role: the law must be 
applied to the fullest extent required by the situation of the 
persons and the objects protected by it.75 
The question arises whether the Armistice constitutes a sufficient 
cessation of hostilities that would make IHL and the Conventions 
inapplicable.  Article 3 may arguably place a damper on the Protocol’s 
applicability to the Korean situation.  It reads: “The application of the 
Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease, in the territory of Parties 
to the conflict, on the general close of military operations . . . .”76  This 
could be interpreted to mean that the Korean Armistice represents a 
“general close of military operations” in the region, and therefore, the 
provisions of the Protocol would not apply.  However, the Commentary 
again sheds light on the application to Korea: 
“Military operations” means the movements, [maneuvers] and 
actions of any sort, carried out by the armed forces with a view to 
combat.  “The general close of military operations” is the same 
expression as that used in Article 6 of the Fourth Convention, 
which, according to the commentary thereon, may be deemed in 
principle to be at the time of a general armistice, capitulation or 
just when the occupation of the whole territory of a Party is 
completed, accompanied by the effective cessation of all 
hostilities, without the necessity of a legal instrument of any kind.  
When there are several States on one side or the other, the 
general close of military operations could mean the complete 
 
74.  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 1, opened for 
signature June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Geneva 
Protocol I]. 
75.  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL 
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 40 
(Yves  Sandoz,  Christophe  Swinarski  &  Bruno  Zimmerman  eds.,  1987), available  at  http:
//www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Commentary_GC_Protocols.pdf, archived at http://per
ma.cc/AZD7-QBP2. 
76.  Geneva Protocol I, supra note 74, art. 3.  
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cessation of hostilities between all belligerents, at least in a 
particular theatre of war.77  
In effect, this language indicates that the Protocol’s application ceases 
only when there is a complete or effective cessation of all hostilities 
among all belligerents.78  This makes sense because “[the Protocol] is 
aimed, above all, at protecting individuals, and not at serving the 
interests of States.”79  Applicability of humanitarian law to protect 
individuals does not cease merely because parties think that hostilities 
will not continue after an armistice.  Again, based on North Korea’s 
historic and continuing military provocations,80 a complete cessation of 
hostilities has not transpired, and therefore, the DPRK’s actions after 
1988 (at a minimum because of accession to the Protocol then) would 
fall under the Protocol. 
B. International Case Law 
The opinion paper of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
analyzed above also presented the primary jurisprudence for its 
definition of an international armed conflict: Prosecutor v. Tadic.81  In its 
maiden case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) considered and defined the term “armed conflict” 
within the bounds of IHL.82  The trial chamber, in considering a motion 
for interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction, found that 
an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State.  International humanitarian 
law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and 
extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general 
 
77.  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 75, at 67–68 (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted). 
78.  More evidence of this meaning is found in the next paragraph of the commentary: 
“The general close of military operations may occur after the ‘cessation of active hostilities’ 
referred to in Article 118 of the Third Convention: although a ceasefire, even a tacit ceasefire, 
may be sufficient for that Convention, military operations can often continue after such a 
ceasefire, even without confrontations.”  Id. at 68. 
79.  Id. at 40. 
80.  See supra note 73 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV. 
81.  ICRC Opinion Paper, supra note 70, at 2 & n.5 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. 
IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995)). 
82.  Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶ 70. 
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conclusion of peace is reached . . . .  Until that moment, 
international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole 
territory of the warring States . . . .83 
The court recognized that determining whether an armed conflict exists 
is a crucial jurisdictional question for international criminal tribunals 
because IHL applies only within the duration of an armed conflict.84  
However, IHL applies whether the armed conflict is international or 
non-international.85  The appellate chamber affirmed this determination 
and added that an internal armed conflict can become international if 
another State intervenes with its own troops or if participants in the 
conflict act on behalf of an outside state.86 
The establishment of the Tadic rule has been confirmed by reliance 
upon it in many subsequent cases.  For example, in Prosecutor v. 
Kupreskic,87 the ICTY trial chamber stated again that “[a]n armed 
conflict can be said to exist whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States.”88  The ICTY has further clarified that a determination 
that an international armed conflict exists predicates application of 
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions as a substantive element 
of a war crime.89  The appeals chamber in Prosecutor v. Naletilic & 
Martinovich90 did just this again in relation to grave breaches under the 
Geneva Conventions.91  The appellate chamber in Tadic further 
ensconced the concept that the existence of an international armed 
conflict activates the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions.92  Although this decision and precedent have proven 
 
83.  Id. 
84.  Id. ¶ 67. 
85. Id. 
86.  Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 84 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). 
87.  Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 
2000). 
88.  Id. ¶ 545; see also Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 175 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008). 
89.  Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-A, Judgment, ¶ 116 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia May 3, 2006). 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. ¶¶ 116–17. 
92.  See Bartram S. Brown, Nationality and Internationality in International 
Humanitarian Law, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 347, 376–77 (1998). 
 2015] ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NORTH KOREA 1167 
controversial,93 it has become a defining element in prosecuting 
defendants for war crimes and these breaches under the conventions. 
Under this definition, the hundreds of armed skirmishes between 
North Korea and primarily South Korea compose a continuing 
“international armed conflict,” especially considering their pattern 
through the decades.  For example, in July of 1997, fourteen North 
Korean soldiers intentionally crossed the DMZ and, after repeated 
warnings to disengage, proceeded to start a twenty-three minute 
exchange of heavy gunfire with South Korean soldiers.94  Accordingly, 
this analysis concludes that IHL would apply to these sorts of situations 
of armed attacks under Tadic, as well as the application of the Geneva 
Convention’s grave breaches provisions.   
C. The DPRK’s Continuing Hostilities: Its Pattern and Goals 
North Korea’s denunciation of the armistice continues a pattern of 
precipitating crises and engaging in provocations.  The DPRK expelled 
mandated neutral armistice observers and closed their facilities to 
increase diplomatic pressure.95  In addition to North Korea’s 
proliferation media dance and defiance, it has systematically 
perpetuated a series of hostilities against several other nations to 
achieve particular goals.96 
From 1953 to 1996, North Korea initiated a total of 361 armed 
attacks, 539 armed incursions, and 687 exchanges of gunfire, aggregating 
a total of 1,587 incidents.97  From 1997 to 2003, infiltrations and 
abductions by North Korean agents, infantry and naval military 
skirmishes, and gunfire exchange remained commonplace.98  For 
example, North Korean ships provoked a nine-day naval confrontation 
with South Korea in the Yellow Sea over disagreement about the 
Northern Limit Line in June of 1999.99  Over the last decade, the DPRK 
has continued its provocations by launching a series of short-range and 
 
93.  See id. at 375–76. 
94.  NANTO, supra note 26, at 15. 
95.  Morris, supra note 2, at 33. 
96.  Tan, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis, supra note 15, at 522–23. 
97.  James M.H. Lee, The Korean Armistice and North–South Dialogue, KOREA 
SOC’Y Q., Summer 2001, at 9, 11 tbl.1. 
98.  NANTO, supra note 26, at 14–26. 
99.  Id. at 19. 
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medium-range missiles into the Sea of Japan (East Sea according to 
Korea) and conducting numerous nuclear tests.100 
Tensions and conflict have not ceased over the last few years.  On 
March 26, 2010, as a recent independent investigation revealed, North 
Korea sank the South Korean navy corvette Cheonan, killing 46 South 
Korean sailors.101  Later on in 2010, on November 23, “North Korea 
fired over 170 artillery rounds toward Yeonpyeong Island in the Yellow 
Sea, killing two South Korean marines and two civilians, injuring many 
more and damaging multiple structures.”102  In 2012, the DPRK 
attempted to launch two satellites, one successfully, which many 
observers considered to be equal to ballistic missile tests and in violation 
of the Leap Day Agreement it had just signed with the U.S.103 
The year 2013 saw perhaps the apogee of such tension.  The latest 
nuclear test of February 2013, conducted less than a month after the UN 
Security Council condemned North Korea’s satellite launches,104 
provoked another strongly worded resolution by the Council to impose 
immediate, greater economic sanctions.105  Although this Article will 
discuss North Korea’s nuclear provocations in greater depth in the next 
section, this bold provocation highlights the North’s continued and 
 
100.  E.g., id. at 17, 25, 26 (August 31, 1998, saw the test fire of “a new 3-stage 
Taepodong-1 missile in an arc over Japan”; February 24, 2003, saw the firing of “a short-
range, anti-ship missile into the Sea of Japan”; and March 2003 saw the firing of “a Silkworm 
ground-to-ship nonballistic missile into the Sea of Japan.”); CHANLETT-AVERY ET AL., supra 
note 42, at 20 (May 1, 2005: “The BBC reports that North Korea has test-fired a short-range 
missile into the Sea of Japan.  The missile was believed to have traveled about 100 kilometers, 
or 60 miles, into the sea between the two countries.”); FISCHER, supra note 73, at 32 
(“03/10/06—North Korea test-fires two short-range missiles from a coastal site on the Sea of 
Japan.  According to a South Korea government official, the missiles probably dropped into 
the sea about 100 km away. . . .  07/04/06—Defying broad international pressure, North 
Korea test-fires six missiles into the Sea of Japan, including a long-range Taepodong-2 with 
the theoretical capacity to reach the continental U.S.  However, the Taepodong-2 failed 40 
seconds into its flight. . . .  07/05/06—North Korea launches a seventh missile, despite broad 
international condemnation of the earlier launches.”) 
101.  EMMA CHANLETT-AVERY & IAN E. RINEHART, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41259, NORTH KOREA: U.S. RELATIONS, NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY, AND INTERNAL 
SITUATION 6–7 (2013).  
102.  Id. at 7. 
103.  See id. at 7–8. 
104.  S.C. Res. 2087, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2087 (Jan. 22, 2013); Press Release, Security 
Council, Security Council Condemns Use of Ballistic Missile Technology in Launch by 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in Resolution 2087 (2013), U.N. Press Release 
SC/10891 (Jan. 22, 2013). 
105.  S.C. Res. 2094, supra note 7; Lederer & Kim, supra note 7. 
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systematic “fist-shaking” at the international community, the Northeast 
Asian region, and the United States.106 
North Korea, while proliferating weapons, tries to creep ever closer 
to its greater goals.  As articulated in depth in the first companion 
article, the DPRK’s ultimate goal of reunifying the Korean peninsula by 
force reinforces the invocation of international humanitarian law.107  In 
addition to intimidation, as the highest-level defector from North Korea, 
Hwang Jang-Yop, has conveyed, North Korea plans to do this by 
removing the United States’ commitment to South Korea and fostering 
positive sentiment towards North Korea within South Korea.108  Its 
continued hostilities have not only kept the region on the brink of full-
scale war but also twisted the arms of the international community to 
provide benefits to the nation.109  It has also sought to intimidate the 
international community and to buy time to perfect nuclear 
capabilities—especially inter-continental ballistic missile capability 
along with the technology to shrink a nuclear device into a missile 
warhead—while keeping the United States, South Korea, and Japan at 
bay.  However, North Korea, by continuing its systematic military 
hostilities and provocations, has ensured that the Korean conflict is not 
yet finished and that the state of war persists.110  Such hostilities trigger 
the application of the laws of international armed conflict and potential 
liability for crimes and violations of such law.111  Applying this law to 
these continued provocations fills the subsequent, penultimate Part.  
IV. APPLYING IHL TO NORTH KOREA’S CONTINUED PROVOCATIONS 
A. The Nuclear Crisis and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
A brief analysis of North Korea’s proliferation defiance illustrates 
the DPRK’s use of serious, systematic provocations and presents an 
important segue into IHL application.  It demonstrates North Korea’s 
goals of reunifying the peninsula through force and intimidation and 
manifests the state’s utter disregard for international law, as well as law 
in general. 
 
106.  See, e.g., Tan, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis, supra note 15, at 522–23; see also 
infra Part IV. 
107.  Tan, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis, supra note 15, at 527. 
108.  Id. at 543–46 & n.195. 
109.  See id. at 527, 536–37. 
110.  See supra Part III.A–B. 
111.  See supra Part III.A–B. 
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1. A Timeline 
On March 12, 1993, North Korea informed the world that it would 
be the first nation in history to withdraw (or attempt to withdraw) from 
the NPT under the guise of the treaty’s Article X provisions.112  The 
DPRK claimed that recent, routine South Korean military exercises and 
a lack of objectivity of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
inspections threatened their state sovereignty and supreme national 
interests.113  It proceeded to attempt this withdrawal just a day before 
the three-month required notice under Article X.114  After reactivating 
its nuclear facilities in December of 2002,115 on January 10, 2003, North 
Korea announced that it would officially withdraw from the NPT the 
following day.116  Its justification was that the aggregate notice of the 
two withdrawal statements was supposedly sufficient to fulfill the three 
month required notice.117 
After several years and rounds of the Six-Party Talks, and after the 
United States’ discovery that North Korea was performing extensive 
money laundering in late 2005, the DPRK threatened to completely 
withdraw from the Six-Party Talks.118  Tensions grew until July 4, 2006, 
when the attempted launching of a long-range missile triggered a 
Security Council resolution condemning the test-firing.119  Three months 
later, on October 9, 2006, North Korea announced that it had 
successfully conducted its first underground nuclear test.120  This led to a 
strongly worded Security Council resolution condemning the test, urging 
North Korea to abandon the program and return to the NPT, and 
imposing widespread military and economic sanctions on the nation.121 
 
112.  A Timeline of North Korea’s Nuclear Development, supra note 60. 
113.  George Bunn & Roland Timerbaev, The Right to Withdraw from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT): The Views of Two NPT Negotiators, YADERNY KONTROL 
(NUCLEAR CONTROL) DIG., Winter/Spring 2005, at 20, 20–21. 
114.  Id. at 21; A Timeline of North Korea’s Nuclear Development, supra note 60. 
115.  A Timeline of North Korea’s Nuclear Development, supra note 60. 
116.  FISCHER, supra note 73, at 25; Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 113, at 21. 
117.  Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 113, at 21. 
118.  See A Timeline of North Korea’s Nuclear Development, supra note 60. 
119.  S.C. Res. 1695, supra note 60 (“Condemns the multiple launches by the DPRK of 
ballistic missiles on 5 July 2006 local time . . . .”); FISCHER, supra note 73, at 32; A Timeline of 
North Korea’s Nuclear Development, supra note 60. 
120.  FISCHER, supra note 73, at 32–33. 
121.  S.C. Res. 1718, ¶¶ 1–8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006) (“Condemns the 
nuclear test proclaimed by the DPRK on 9 October 2006 in flagrant disregard of its relevant 
resolutions, in particular resolution 1695 (2006), as well as of the statement of its President of 
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Less than three years later and after years of further negotiations 
and nuclear tension, North Korea conducted a second nuclear test on 
April 5, 2009.122  Another strong Security Council resolution passed 
shortly thereafter condemning the test, extending sanctions, and 
allowing for the inspection of all cargo to and from the DPRK.123  
However, such sanctions did not induce North Korea to return to the 
NPT.  As if the DPRK did not learn of the gravity of its offenses, in 
2012, after years of test-firing short and medium-range missiles 
mentioned above, it attempted to launch two satellites, bringing forth 
more Security Council disapproval.124  Most recently, North Korea 
conducted another nuclear test on February 12, 2013, sparking 
international criticism, including from China, the DPRK’s closest ally, 
and further rebuke by the Security Council.125 
2. Probing for Significance 
One may ask why such acts bear significance in relation to 
international armed conflict and international humanitarian law.  Two 
answers follow: (1) by incorrectly withdrawing from the NPT and 
egregiously violating the treaty’s provisions thereafter, North Korea has 
insistently defied international law, and (2) available jurisprudence 
suggests that such breaches and threats of nuclear violence violate the 
principles found in the UN Charter and violate the general principles of 
international law applicable in armed conflict. 
Article X of the NPT states that parties may withdraw from the 
treaty if a state “decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject 
matter of [the] Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its 
country,” further requiring the party to give notice of any withdrawal 
and the reasons for doing so to all contracting parties and the Security 
 
6 October 2006 (S/PRST/2006/41), including that such a test would bring universal 
condemnation of the international community and would represent a clear threat to 
international peace and security . . . .”). 
122.  A Timeline of North Korea’s Nuclear Development, supra note 60. 
123.  S.C. Res. 1874, supra note 13. 
124.  S.C. Res. 2087, supra note 104, ¶ 1 (“Condemns the DPRK’s launch of 12 
December 2012, which used ballistic missile technology and was in violation of resolutions 
1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) . . . .”); CHANLETT-AVERY & RINEHART, supra note 101, at 7. 
125.  S.C. Res. 2094, supra note 7, ¶ 1 (“Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear 
test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 (local time) in violation and flagrant 
disregard of the Council’s relevant resolutions . . . .”); Lederer & Kim, supra note 7. 
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Council three months in advance.126  North Korea simply did not do this, 
and thus, the NPT still applies to its actions to this very day.  When the 
DPRK first reasoned that their supreme interest was at stake, they 
highlighted two reasons: (1) South Korea’s standard military exercises 
and (2) the IAEA’s biased nature toward inspections of nuclear 
facilities.127  South Korea posed no nuclear threat to North Korea at this 
time—not having such capabilities—and the United States withdrew 
nuclear weapons in the region, albeit while retaining remote strike 
capabilities.128  
Further, it strains credibility as to how any “biased” (so accused 
because it successfully uncovered illicit activity) IAEA special 
inspections regarding a small reprocessing plant posed any nuclear 
threat or other imminent threat to North Korea, or even amounted to 
an extraordinary event.129  Indeed, the accurate analysis of the IAEA 
that circumvented the DPRK’s attempts to hide its military nuclear 
program led to the DPRK’s protest and ejection of IAEA inspectors 
and monitoring devices.130  Additionally, the objections differed in the 
second notice of withdrawal.131 
Those that produced the NPT intended that the treaty’s notice 
requirement help the Security Council and treaty members determine if 
valid reasons necessitating withdrawal exist based on a security threat to 
the withdrawing state, and whether to support, delay, or deny such 
withdrawal.132  North Korea did not adequately allow this to happen and 
then ignored the Council on several occasions when the Council 
concluded that no reason existed that necessitated withdrawal.133  
 
126.  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. X, July 1, 1968, 729 
U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970) [hereinafter NPT]. 
127.  Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 113, at 21. 
128.  See id. at 23; Tan, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis, supra note 15, at 529 (“[I]n 
1991, the United States removed all of its nuclear weapons from Korea.”). 
129.  See Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 113, at 23. 
130.  See JASPER BECKER, ROGUE REGIME: KIM JONG IL AND THE LOOMING THREAT 
OF NORTH KOREA 165–89 (2005). 
131.  Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 113, at 21 (“In North Korea’s 2003 letter to NPT 
parties, it complained of President Bush’s inclusion of it within his ‘axis of evil’ category and it 
maintained that the United States was targeting it for a preemptive strike.  But, since it did 
not provide a new three-month withdrawal period, it had to have been relying on its 1993 
notice of withdrawal as justification, and that notice did not contain these reasons.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
132.  Id. at 21–22. 
133.  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2094, supra note 7, ¶¶ 3–5 (“Condemns all the DPRK’s ongoing 
nuclear activities, including its uranium enrichment, notes that all such activities are in 
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Furthermore, North Korea cannot patch together notice time periods to 
get past this notice requirement by pulling out a lapsed withdrawal and 
reinstating it a decade in the future.134  North Korea’s approach 
frustrates the object and purpose of the Treaty. 
Additionally, IAEA Safeguards and IAEA inspections should have 
continued during these withdrawal periods,135 something not possible 
considering North Korea refused to allow inspectors into the few areas 
where it likely produced nuclear weapons (i.e., the small reprocessing 
plant in Yongbyon)—well before a final supposed withdrawal in 2003.136  
In essence, it is difficult to see how North Korea’s “withdrawal” could 
have been effective at any point in time to make the NPT not binding.  
However, a compelling case has been made that, even if North Korea 
had effectively withdrawn at its first attempt, the IAEA Safeguards 
provisions still would have applied, resulting in a clear breach of the 
NPT’s provisions.137 
The NPT’s application of its substantive provisions disallows the 
path that North Korea has pursued.  Article II states that each party 
agrees “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any 
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices.”138  It is impossible to test nuclear weapons without 
manufacturing them or acquiring help to do the same, as they reportedly 
received nuclear centrifuge technology from Pakistan in return for 
 
violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009) and 2087 (2013), reaffirms its decision that 
the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, in a 
complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities and 
shall act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and 
the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) . . . .”). 
134.  See Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 113, at 23 (“In North Korea’s view, by its 2003 
announcement and a one-day notice period, it had fulfilled the NPT’s three-month notice 
requirement because it was relying on the 89 days that had gone by after the 1993 notice was 
given before North Korea announced that the 1993 notice was no longer in effect.”). 
135.  See Perez, supra note 6, at 797. 
136.  Bunn & Timerbaev, supra note 113, at 20–21; A Timeline of North Korea’s Nuclear 
Development, supra note 60. 
137.  See Perez, supra note 6, at 797.  Professor Perez presented  compelling arguments 
on the subject: that the IAEA’s right to safeguards based on the special investigation 
requested before North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, in effect, survived the withdrawal, 
thereby making North Korea’s refusal to allow inspections a continued breach of the NPT’s 
provisions, which could have been justification for Security Council sanctions.  Id. at 752–53.  
138.  NPT, supra note 126, art. II. 
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medium-range ballistic missile technology.139  Article III maintains that 
parties must accept IAEA safeguards and actions taken thereupon.140  
North Korea essentially violated this article outright with its refusal to 
allow certain inspections in 1993 based on these safeguards, which 
ironically led to its attempted withdrawal from the treaty in the first 
place.141  Article VI requires parties “to pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race 
at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general 
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international 
control.”142  North Korea has repeatedly defied this principle in its 
outright condemnation and violations of many negotiated agreements 
related to nuclear proliferation and intentionally ignoring numerous 
Security Council resolutions, sometimes days after their promulgation.143 
Moreover, nuclear threats and any use of such weapons violate 
principles of international law even beyond the NPT.  The International 
Court of Justice in its Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
advisory opinion (Nuclear Weapons Case) confirmed this notion.144  The 
court unanimously concluded that “[a] threat or use of nuclear weapons 
should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law 
applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and 
rules of international humanitarian law.”145  It also found that an 
obligation exists “to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion 
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under 
strict and effective international control.”146  With North Korea’s 
repeated defiance of the NPT and the IAEA, as illustrated above, and 
the numerous inter-Korean and other agreements that it has signed to 
put an end to proliferation on the Korean peninsula, good faith fails to 
fit North Korea’s forcible reunification goal.147 
 
139.  SHARON A. SQUASSONI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31900, WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION: TRADE BETWEEN NORTH KOREA AND PAKISTAN 3–4, 7 (2006). 
140.  NPT, supra note 126, art. III. 
141.  See supra note 127 and accompanying text.  
142.  NPT, supra note 126, art. VI. 
143.  See, e.g., supra Part II.C and notes 112–25 and accompanying text. 
144.  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226 (July 8). 
145.  Id. at 266. 
146.  Id. at 267. 
147.  Tan, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis, supra note 15, at 532–33 (discussing North 
Korea’s breaching of the Agreed Framework); see supra Parts II, IV.A and note 126. 
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More importantly, a majority of the Court specified how these 
requirements fit together: 
[T]he threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be 
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law; 
However, in view of the current state of international law, 
and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot 
conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance 
of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at 
stake. . . .148 
After the passing of the Security Council resolution on March 7, 
2013, which strongly condemned North Korea’s third nuclear test, the 
DPRK directly threatened a preemptive nuclear attack against the 
United States.149  Just like the repeated threats directed to South Korea, 
in which the North has threatened to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire,”150 
this reaction of the 7th of March included a statement by Army General 
Kang Pyo-Tolg Yong that long-range nuclear missiles would be 
launched against Washington, D.C., so that it would “be engulfed in a 
sea of fire.”151  These sorts of nuclear threats contravene the 
aforementioned ICJ opinion.  Additionally, North Korea does not make 
such threats out of self-defense, since neither aggression nor threat of 
aggression from any other state precipitated this highly inflammatory 
threat; conversely, it would be more appropriate under this standard to 
see that South Korea would be entitled to put forth such threats—
considering North Korea’s systematic provocations and hostilities over 
the last fifty-five years against that state.152 
Furthermore, the ICJ also alluded that such nuclear threats violate 
certain aspects of customary international law.  For example, the court 
 
148.  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 266. 
149.  Lederer & Kim, supra note 7. 
150.  NANTO, supra note 26, at 12 (“03/1994—For the first time in more than two 
decades, North Korea issued a threat of war in an inter-Korean meeting in Panmunjom.  In 
response to Seoul’s chief delegate mentioning the possibility of UN sanctions against the 
North for its refusal to accept full international nuclear inspections, Pyongyang’s chief 
delegate reportedly replied: ‘Seoul is not far away from here.  If a war breaks out, Seoul will 
turn into a sea of fire.’” (quoting John Burton, North Korea’s “Sea of Fire” Threat Shakes 
Seoul, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1994, at 6)). 
151.  Lederer & Kim, supra note 7 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
152.  See supra Part III.C. 
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concluded in the Nuclear Weapons Case that “[a] threat or use of force 
by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, 
of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the 
requirements of Article 51, is unlawful.”153  Paragraph four indicates that 
UN members must refrain from using “threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”154  This 
paragraph and the court’s conclusion matter because North Korea 
ultimately aims to destroy “the territorial integrity or political 
independence of” South Korea and reunite the peninsula by force.155  
Notably, the DPRK recently joined the UN as a member state.  
Furthermore, this principle may have risen to customary international 
law status.156 
B. Applicable Treaties and Conventions  
In addition to North Korea’s proliferation mischief, its systematic 
hostilities towards South Korea, Japan, the United States, and other 
nations create greater ramifications under applicable international 
humanitarian law treaties and conventions.  Restrictions on the means 
of warfare (jus in bello) follow with the application of IHL.  
Applicability to the present Korean conflict and North Korea’s actions 
are indisputable because the DPRK signed or ratified every treaty and 
convention indicated below.  This section will demonstrate that the 
DPRK’s actions provide a solid basis for grave breaches of IHL and 
other international law. 
1. The Geneva Conventions and Protocol I 
Two of the 1949 Geneva Conventions rise to the level of primary 
concerns in our analysis: the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (Geneva Convention 
III)157 and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 (Geneva Convention IV).158  
 
153.  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 266. 
154.  U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
155.  See, e.g., Tan, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis, supra note 15, at 519, 527, 533–34. 
156.  See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell & Maria Alevras-Chen, The Ban on the Bomb—
And Bombing: Iran, the U.S., and the International Law of Self-Defense, 57 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 497, 502–03 (2007). 
157.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. 
158.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
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This Article focuses on these two because the first two conventions 
apply to wounded, sick, and shipwrecked armed forces, classes of 
individuals that have not been the primary victims of North Korea’s 
more current hostilities since 1958, when the DPRK became subject to 
the Geneva Conventions’ provisions.159  Prisoners of war (POWs) and 
civilians have not fared as well. 
Geneva Convention III provides an extensive protective framework 
for prisoners of war in armed conflict.  Article 12 makes it clear that 
states retain responsibility for these individuals’ treatment, regardless of 
whom or what military unit captured them.160  The majority of Geneva 
Convention III outlines the living conditions of POWs, who should 
receive humane treatment from the detaining power; murdering or 
endangering the health of a POW counts as a grave breach of the 
Convention’s provisions.161  Violence, intimidation, torture, 
experimentation, and discrimination against POWs run contrary to 
Geneva Convention III.162  From Article 21 to Article 130, Geneva 
Convention III lists and explains the necessary treatment of POWs by 
the detaining power, requiring everything from providing adequate food 
and proper living arrangements (i.e., basic necessities)163 to freedom of 
religion, reasonable payment for work performed while detained, and 
even periodic visits from the representatives of their home countries.164  
Indeed, the law even requires states to allow POWs to participate in 
recreational activities, write to their families back home, and elect 
representatives from their camps!165  Article 129 requires parties to the 
convention to enact proper legislation to punish those individuals who 
violate such treatment requirements of POWs,166 while Article 131 
 
Aug 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention IV]. 
159.  See supra Parts III.A, C. 
160.  Geneva Convention III, supra note 157, art. 12.  
161.  Id. art. 13 (“Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated.  Any unlawful 
act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a 
prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the 
present Convention.”). 
162.  Id. arts. 13–17, 130. 
163.  E.g., id. art. 25. 
164.  E.g., id. arts. 34, 60–67, 126. 
165.  E.g., id. arts. 38, 70, 79–81. 
166.  Id. art. 129 (“The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation 
necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be 
committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following 
Article.”). 
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specifies that parties cannot absolve themselves of “any liability 
incurred by [themselves] . . . or by another High Contracting Party in 
respect of [grave] breaches.”167 
South Korea’s National Intelligence Service has reported in the 
recent past that 407 POWs still remained in North Korea, of which 268 
were said to be alive in January of 2001 (83 fewer than the previous 
September).168  It also reported that a total of 16 POWs had been 
returned between 1994 and September of 2000, after years of hard labor 
and “re-education” in the DPRK.169  Although estimates are scarce on 
actual POW numbers and their treatment, one incident gives an 
example of how North Korea has violated and continues to violate 
Geneva III in their treatment. 
On January 23, 1968, North Korea attacked and seized the 
intelligence ship, the USS Pueblo, in international waters, killing one 
crewman and detaining 82 others.170  The DPRK incarcerated the crew 
until mid-December of that year when it returned them to South Korea, 
but the ship stayed behind as a trophy museum piece for the regime.171  
Within that time period, North Korea quartered several to a room, and 
the POWs were “threatened with death, interrogated, and some were 
severely beaten,” eliciting supposed “[c]onfessions” as to their “criminal 
aggressive acts.”172  Their treatment was documented through interviews 
shortly after their return by the Naval Health Research Center in 
California: 
 
167.  Id. arts. 130–31 (“Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be 
those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected 
by the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a 
prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of 
war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.”). 
168.  NANTO, supra note 26, at 5 & n.10.  
169.  Id. at n.10. 
170.  NANTO, supra note 26, at 4; RAYMOND C. SPAULDING, NAVAL HEALTH 
RESEARCH CTR., SOME EXPERIENCES REPORTED BY THE CREW OF THE USS PUEBLO AND 
AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR FROM VIETNAM 2 (1975), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dt
ic/tr/fulltext/u2/a077057.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TMK5-E5VK; Richard Mobley, 
Pueblo: A Retrospective, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Spring 2001, at 98, 98, available at https://ww
w.usnwc.edu/getattachment/08740ee7-e8a4-497e-83c8-6a12bb3e3827/Pueblo--A-Retrospectiv
e---Mobley,-Richard.aspx, archived at https://perma.cc/XKD4-PUHM. 
171.  NANTO, supra note 26, at 4; SPAULDING, supra note 170, at 5; Mobley, supra note 
170, at 98. 
172.  SPAULDING, supra note 170, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Their treatment by the North Koreans varied; in general the 
living quarters, sanitation facilities and medical care were 
unsatisfactory by western standards.  Food was deficient both in 
quality and quantity.  Physical maltreatment was concentrated in 
two specific periods—the first three weeks (i.e. until all had 
“confessed”) and a “purge” two weeks prior to release in an 
effort to obtain names of those crew members who had 
attempted to communicate their lack of sincerity to the western 
world.  (Propaganda photographs often showed smiling faces in 
association with obscene gestures.) Physical abuse consisted of 
fist assaults or kicks in the head or groin.  Several crew members 
who were forced to squat with an inch square stick behind their 
knees reported losing consciousness and, as a result of the 
beatings, one man had a fractured jaw.  Through lectures, field 
trips, and written material, the North Koreans attempted to 
convince crew members of the injustices of their “imperialist” 
government.173 
Because of such treatment, researchers discovered that the men were 
initially depressed and anxious upon return and weeks later were angry 
and increasingly hostile toward others.174 
The USS Pueblo incident demonstrates that North Korea does not 
treat POWs as required under Geneva Convention III.  The 
psychological and mental torture to which the DPRK subjected them, 
along with inadequate living quarters, show that the DPRK committed 
grave breaches of this Convention in 1968.175  Current POWs apparently 
have not been allowed to write home to their families.176  North Korea 
retains culpability for these violations. 
Geneva Convention IV has a similar objective to Geneva 
Convention III, but instead of protecting POWs, it seeks to protect 
civilians.  Civilians under the Convention “are those who, at a given 
 
173.  Id. 
174.  Id. at 10–11. 
175.  See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 157, arts. 17, 130. 
176.  In fact, few non-citizens of the DPRK can find their way into the North.  Even the 
Special Rapporteurs appointed by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights have been disallowed from entering North Korea to investigate mass human rights 
abuses.  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 67/181, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/181 (Dec. 20, 2012) (“The 
continued refusal of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to 
recognize the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or to extend cooperation to him, despite the renewal 
of the mandate by the Human Rights Council in its resolutions 7/15, 10/16, 13/14, 16/8 and 
19/13 . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
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moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a 
conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”177  These individuals, 
like POWs, must be granted respect and be free from all forms of 
violence or coercion.178  Article 34 prohibits taking hostages, and under 
Articles 25 and 35, civilians may write to their family and possibly leave 
the country.179  As with Convention III, states retain responsibility for 
the treatment of civilians regardless of individual responsibility.180  Even 
if civilians suffer confinement, standards in the Convention grant 
humane treatment,181 adequate housing, food, water, clothing, and 
health needs,182 freedom of religion and recreational opportunities,183 a 
complaint system and representation,184 and even an outlet for allowing 
family visits.185  Any internment must end once the necessity ends, and 
international humanitarian organizations must have access to these 
civilians.186  As with Convention III, grave breaches include torture, 
inhumane treatment, murdering and other causing of suffering; parties 
cannot absolve themselves of liability from these grave breaches.187 
Just a few examples illustrate that North Korea has also 
continuously violated Geneva Convention IV.  In December of 1969, 
“North Korean agents hijacked a South Korean airliner YS-11 to 
Wonsan en route from Kangnung to Seoul with 51 persons aboard,” of 
which 12 remained in custody as of January of 2001.188  The South 
Koreans aboard the plane places this incident under Geneva IV.  A few 
more kidnapping and hostage cases illustrate North Korea’s actions 
contrary to Geneva IV: Kim Jong-Il ordered the kidnapping of South 
Korean actress Choi Eun-hee and her husband Shin Sang-ok in 
February of 1978, and the DPRK abducted a South Korean teacher in 
June of 1979, a South Korean student in August of 1987, a pastor in July 
 
177.  Geneva Convention IV, supra note 158, art. 4. 
178.  Id. arts. 27, 31–32. 
179.  Id. arts. 25, 34–35. 
180.  Id. art. 29. 
181.  Id. art. 37. 
182.  Id. arts. 85, 89, 90, 92. 
183.  Id. arts. 93–94. 
184.  Id. arts. 101–04. 
185.  Id. art. 116. 
186.  Id. arts. 132, 142–43. 
187.  Id. arts. 147, 148. 
188.  NANTO, supra note 26, at 5. 
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of 1995, a South Korean businessman in September of 1999, and a U.S. 
reverend in January of 2000.189  When North Korea seizes hostages in 
clear violation of Article 34,190 it often does not allow them to write 
home to their families, to leave the country, or to accept visits from 
international organizations like the Red Cross.191  North Korea has not 
adopted as its modus operandi the disclosure of the precise location of 
these civilian prisoners to the protecting power (i.e., South Korea or the 
United States) or their families under Article 83,192 and at times does not 
release them under Article 132 after any supposed necessity for their 
internment has ended.193  North Korea sometimes subjects these 
individuals to torture, not unlike what it inflicts upon the estimated 
120,000–200,000 North Korean citizens found in concentration camps 
scattered throughout the country.194 
The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I)195 creates several additional protections for POWs 
and civilians and provides very clear humanitarian standards for armed 
 
189.  Id. at 7, 10, 12, 20. 
190.  A good definition of “hostage taking” that demonstrates North Korea is likely 
violating international law can be found in Article 1 of the International Convention Against 
the Taking of Hostages, a convention that unfortunately they are not a party to:  
Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to 
detain another person . . . in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an 
international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a 
group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit 
condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages 
(“hostage-taking”) within the meaning of this Convention. 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, art. 1, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 
205 (entered into force June 3, 1983).  
191.  E.g., BECKER, supra note 130, at 147–48. 
192.  Geneva Convention IV, supra note 158, art. 83 (“The Detaining Power shall give 
the enemy Powers, through the intermediary of the Protecting Powers, all useful information 
regarding the geographical location of places of internment.  Whenever military 
considerations permit, internment camps shall be indicated by the letters IC, placed so as to 
be clearly visible in the daytime from the air.  The Powers concerned may, however, agree 
upon any other system of marking.  No place other than an internment camp shall be marked 
as such.”). 
193.  Id. art. 132 (“Each interned person shall be released by the Detaining Power as 
soon as the reasons which necessitated his internment no longer exist.”). 
194.  See, for example, DAVID HAWK, CONCENTRATIONS OF INHUMANITY 8 (2007), 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/ConcentrationsInhumanity.pdf, archived at https://
perma.cc/A7T8-PKGH, one of several of David Hawk’s reports from defectors finding that 
up to 200,000 North Koreans are in such camps across the North. 
195.  Geneva Protocol I, supra note 74. 
 1182 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:1147 
conflict.  For example, it protects POWs and civilians from medical 
experiments, a grave breach of the protocol.196  Under Articles 32, 33 
and 34, contracting parties must inform families of their relatives’ fates 
promptly and also respect the remains of the dead and search for 
missing persons after the cessation of active hostilities.197  The principle 
of distinction, memorialized in numerous articles, requires that attacks 
target only military personnel and military establishments rather than 
civilians and civilian structures.198  An indiscriminate attack does not aim 
for a specific military objective.199  This principle forbids military 
reprisals against the civilian population.200  Article 60 prohibits parties 
from extending “their military operations to zones on which they have 
conferred by agreement the status of demilitarized zone, if such 
extension is contrary to the terms of this agreement.”201  The best known 
DMZ globally, ironically the most militarized border in the world, 
divides the two Koreas and frequently sees skirmishes. 
Article 75 provides a minimum human rights floor prohibiting all 
violence against a protected individual’s health (i.e., murder, physical 
and mental torture, corporal punishment, and mutilation), humiliating 
and degrading treatment, forced prostitution, and any form of indecent 
assault; it also prohibits the taking of hostages, collective punishments, 
and threats of any such acts.202  Grave breaches include targeting 
civilians, launching indiscriminate attacks, making demilitarized zones 
the object of attack, and unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of POWs 
or civilians.203  These breaches constitute “war crimes” under 
Protocol I.204  Most importantly, Article 91 summarizes responsibility: 
“A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions 
or of this Protocol shall . . . be liable to pay compensation.  It shall be 
responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed 
forces.”205 
 
196.  Id. art. 11. 
197.  Id. arts. 32–34. 
198.  E.g., id. arts. 48, 51. 
199.  Id. art. 51. 
200.  Id. 
201.  Id. art. 60. 
202.  Id. art. 75. 
203.  Id. art. 85. 
204.  Id. 
205.  Id. art. 91.  
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All of these provisions of Protocol I point directly to numerous 
hostile acts that North Korea has committed after 1988, when it ratified 
this Protocol.206  For example, in April of 1996, on three occasions, 
hundreds of armed North Koreans crossed into the DMZ at or near 
Panmunjom in clear violation of the armistice.207  Seven more crossed 
the DMZ the following month, along with eight ships clashing with 
South Korean forces on two separate occasions.208  Twenty-four more 
died doing the same that September while on a failed 
espionage/reconnaissance mission.209  These incidents violate Article 60 
as well as the grave breaches provisions of the Protocol.   
Consider the North Korean patrol boats that fired on a fishing vessel 
in May of 1995, killing three fishermen and detaining five more for over 
six months210 in transgression of Article 51.  In further violation of 
Article 51, North Korean agents poisoned Choi Duk-Keun, a South 
Korean diplomat, while in Russia, to “retaliate” for the above 
submarine espionage attack gone awry in September.211  In 
contravention to Articles 32 through 34, North Korea abducted over a 
dozen Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s.  In response to 
protests, the DPRK subsequently sent boxes of ashes to Japan; contrary 
to North Korea’s claims, tests revealed that the boxes did not contain 
the remains of the kidnapped victims.212  Such episodes have galvanized 
the Japanese populace against North Korea.   
An additional violation of Article 51 transpired in November of 2010 
when the North unleashed “over 170 artillery rounds toward 
Yeonpyeong Island in the Yellow Sea, killing two South Korean 
marines and two civilians,” injuring nineteen, and damaging several 
structures.213  No intended, specific military target related to the 
Yeonpyeong Island attack has emerged to date. 
2. Illicit Weapons  
In addition to the NPT, North Korea ratified two important weapons 
treaties: the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, 
 
206.  See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
207.  FISCHER, supra note 73, at 12–13. 
208.  Id. at 13. 
209.  Id. 
210.  Id. at 12. 
211.  See id. at 13. 
212.  MANYIN ET AL., supra note 42, at 7. 
213.  CHANLETT-AVERY & RINEHART, supra note 101, at 7. 
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Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare 
(Gas Protocol)214 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological 
Weapons Convention).215  The Gas Protocol prohibits the use of 
bacteriological warfare methods,216 and the Biological Weapons 
Convention widely expands such prohibitions.217 
Under the Biological Weapons Convention, parties must not 
develop or manufacture biological agents, toxins, and weapons for 
armed conflict,218 and must destroy such weapons or divert them to 
peaceful purposes within nine months of the convention entering into 
force.219  It also prohibits states from transferring such weapons to 
another state or assisting production of such weapons,220 as well as 
requiring states to take all necessary measures to prevent development 
or retention of them.221  Parties have a duty to “continue negotiations in 
good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective 
measures for the prohibition of their development, production and 
stockpiling and for their destruction.”222 
Sources such as the Russian Federal Foreign Intelligence Service, 
the South Korean Ministry of Defense, and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) have reported that North Korea has been developing 
biological weapons since the 1960s.223  Some reports from South Korea 
claim that the DPRK could have up to thirteen biological agents and 
pathogens that the DPRK could easily “weaponize” (if it has not done 
so already) and use in armed conflict, including anthrax, cholera, the 
 
214.  Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571 
[hereinafter Gas Protocol]. 
215.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 
U.S.T. 583 [hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention]. 
216.  Gas Protocol, supra note 214, at 575 (“That the High Contracting Parties . . . agree 
to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare . . . .”). 
217.  See Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 215, art. I. 
218.  Id. 
219.  Id. art. II. 
220.  Id. art. III. 
221.  Id. art. IV. 
222.  Id. art. IX (emphasis added).  
223.  Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present, 
JAMES MARTIN CTR. FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUD., http://cns.miis.edu/cbw/possess.htm 
(last updated Mar. 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/ML2X-ER38. 
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plague, yellow fever, and smallpox.224  Simply having these capabilities 
ready to use for combat alone breaks the Biological Weapons 
Convention,225 and North Korea’s continued development after signing 
the Convention demonstrates yet another grave breach.226 
3. Additional Protections and Restrictions  
The DPRK has signed several other conventions providing 
additional protections to certain classes of people and further limiting its 
behavior pertaining to armed conflict.  They include the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (Diplomatic Agents 
Convention),227 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Child 
Convention),228 the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (Terrorism Convention),229 the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide 
 
224.  North Korea: Biological, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, http://www.nti.org/count
ry-profiles/north-korea/biological/ (last updated Dec. 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4ZRP
-PXPM. 
225.  See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (May 6, 2002), available at Lecture #743 on Missile Defense, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (May 6, 2002), http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/beyond-the-axis-
of-evil, archived at http://perma.cc/GY4L-YZ9U (“North Korea has a dedicated, national-
level effort to achieve a BW capability and has developed and produced, and may have 
weaponized, BW agents in violation of the Convention.”). 
226.  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, STATES PARTY TO THE FOLLOWING 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND OTHER RELATED TREATIES AS OF 13-MAY-
2015,  at  8  (2015), http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/dihl_setup.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/domino/Open
Attachment/applic/ihl/dihl_setup.nsf/6A9E93D954458967C1257DF100397C0C/%24File/IHL
_and_other_related_Treaties.pdf?Open, archived at http://perma.cc/2UEV-GSM3 (showing 
that North Korea signed the Biological Weapons Convention on March 13, 1987).  For the 
U.S. Secretary of Defense’s sources and investigations of North Korea’s various chemical, 
biological, and nuclear capabilities, see also OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., PROLIFERATION: THREAT AND RESPONSE (2001), http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif0
0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JM4Y-QCXB; Biological Weapons Program, FED’N OF AM. 
SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/bw/index.html (last visited May 26, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/TU2P-CFC2. 
227.  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (entered 
into force Feb. 20, 1977) [hereinafter Diplomatic Agents Convention].  
228.  Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered 
into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Child Convention]. 
229.  International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 
9, 1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197 (entered into force Apr. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Terrorism 
Convention]. 
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Convention),230 and the Convention on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 
(War Crimes Convention).231 
North Korea acceded to the Diplomatic Agents Convention on 
December 1, 1982.232  The Convention’s purpose is to prevent 
assassinations and assassination attempts of diplomats by requiring state 
parties to prohibit such acts in domestic law.233  Heads of state, as well as 
representatives or state officials or agents of international organizations, 
along with their immediate family members, receive protection.234  
States agreeing to this Convention must desist from murdering, 
kidnapping, or attacking protected persons; violently attacking their 
known premises; threatening to do so; attempting such acts; or even 
playing a part in such acts.235  Under the treaty, states should criminalize 
such actions, track down perpetrators, and inform other states of the 
violator’s whereabouts and circumstances if they have the proper 
knowledge.236 
The timing of the DPRK’s accession to this convention presents an 
irony because just four months prior Canadian police uncovered a North 
Korean plot to assassinate then-South Korean President Chun Doo 
Hwan during a visit to that nation.237  More ironically, North Korea 
attempted to assassinate the South Korean president again the following 
year in Myanmar—even after becoming a party to the convention.238  
North Korea evinces no respect for the concept of pacta sunt servanda.239 
The Child Convention, the most ratified human rights treaty in the 
world, also applies to North Korea’s actions.  Article 38 requires that 
 
230.  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
231.  Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and 
Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73 (entered into force Nov. 11, 1970) 
[hereinafter War Crimes Convention]. 
232.  Accession to Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 1, 1982, 1295 U.N.T.S. 
393 (entered into force Dec. 31, 1982). 
233.  See Diplomatic Agents Convention, supra note 227, art. 3. 
234.  Id. art. 1. 
235.  Id. art. 2. 
236.  Id. art. 5. 
237.  FISCHER, supra note 73, at 8. 
238.  Id. at 8–9. 
239.  Loosely translated, pacta sunt servanda means “treaty obligations must be met” or 
“kept” in Latin.  Benjamin Neaderland, Note, Quandary on the Yalu: International Law, 
Politics, and China’s North Korean Refugee Crisis, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 143, 157 (2004). 
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“States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of 
international humanitarian law applicable to [children] in armed 
conflicts which are relevant to the child” and that “Parties shall take all 
feasible measures to ensure protection and care of children who are 
affected by an armed conflict.”240  The DPRK signed this convention in 
August of 1990 and ratified it in September of 1990.241  Since that time, 
North Korea has failed to protect its own children in a time of ongoing 
war and famine on the peninsula.  “UNICEF has reported that each 
year some 40,000 North Korean children under five became ‘acutely 
malnourished,’ with 25,000 needing hospital treatment.  The food 
security situation improved slightly from 2011 to 2012, but 28% of the 
population reportedly suffers from stunting.”242  However, when looking 
at the money spent on its military, if North Korea effectively transferred 
this spending by approximately even five to ten percent on agricultural 
infrastructure, for example, it could markedly ameliorate this 
situation.243 
Similar to the Diplomatic Agents Convention, the Terrorism 
Convention seeks to eliminate and prevent acts of international 
terrorism around the world.244  Through its many articles, the 
Convention requires state parties to illegalize terrorism, prosecute it, 
and prevent it, especially through suppressing funding.245  North Korea 
signed the Convention in November of 2001.246  Although it has not yet 
ratified the Convention, it is important to note its continued defiance in 
regards to the treaty.  Signing a convention marks a commitment not to 
contravene the object and purpose of that treaty.  North Korea has a 
history of supporting terrorism financially and militarily247—abundant 
 
240.  Child Convention, supra note 228, art. 38. 
241.  Id. 
242.  CHANLETT-AVERY & RINEHART, supra note 101, at 16–17. 
243.  Tan, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis, supra note 15, at 539. 
244.  Terrorism Convention, supra note 229, at pmbl. (“Being convinced of the urgent 
need to enhance international cooperation among States in devising and adopting effective 
measures for the prevention of the financing of terrorism, as well as for its suppression 
through the prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators . . . .”). 
245.  Id. arts. 4–19. 
246.  Id. at 282. 
247.  See Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., North Korea and Support to Terrorism: An Evolving 
History, 3 J. STRATEGIC SECURITY 45 (2010) (giving a history of North Korea’s support to 
terrorist and radical groups, including the Japanese Red Army and the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine); see also FISCHER, supra note 73, at 24 (describing the Scud missiles 
on their way to Yemen in 2002 found by allied forces in the Persian Gulf aboard a North 
Korean ship). 
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evidence can be found showing that the DPRK has supported numerous 
terrorist organizations since 2001—including Syrian and Lebanese 
terrorists, the Tamil Tigers, and Hezbollah—by helping them train in 
North Korea, building structures and bunkers, as well as selling missiles 
and chemical weapons.248 
North Korea became a party to the Genocide Convention on 
January 31, 1989.249  Parties, by signing the convention, according to the 
very first article of the treaty, are explicitly “confirm[ing] that genocide, 
whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under 
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.”250  
Genocide is considered “any of the following acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such” under Article II: 
 (a) Killing members of the group; 
 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
 (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or 
in part; 
 (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
 (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.251 
Article III forbids genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, 
direct/public incitement to commit it, an attempt to commit it, and 
complicity in genocide.252 
As explored in the previous companion articles, North Korea has 
been engaging in genocide for decades.  Numerous accounts have been 
recorded of infanticide policies involving Chinese and partially Chinese 
children.253  The DPRK directly kills them by stabbing, shooting, 
 
248.  Bechtol, supra note 247, at 49–51 (giving a more recent history of North Korean 
terrorist financing and aid).  
249.  Accession to Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Jan. 31, 1989, 1523 U.N.T.S. 352 (entered into force May 1, 1989). 
250.  Genocide Convention, supra note 230, art. 1 (emphasis added). 
251.  Id. art. 2. 
252.  Id. art. 3. 
253.  See, e.g., Morse H. Tan, A State of Rightlessness: The Egregious Case of North 
Korea, 80 MISS. L.J. 681, 699 (2010) [hereinafter Tan, A State of Rightlessness] (providing the 
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suffocation, or intentional abandonment.  North Korea also destroys 
them in the womb by severely beating the women or by other forced 
abortion techniques.254  North Korea similarly targets Christians, who 
find themselves systematically imprisoned, tortured, and executed.255  
Genocide has been a crime against humanity since the International 
Military Tribunals of Nuremberg.  Some scholars of international law 
consider it the ultimate crime. 
The War Crimes Convention also intersects with North Korea’s 
actions during armed conflicts.  That Convention seeks to extend any 
statutes of limitations for war crimes indefinitely.256  Such crimes (i.e., 
war crimes and crimes against humanity) include the aforementioned 
grave breaches regarding the Geneva Conventions (e.g., directly 
attacking civilians), apartheid, and genocide.257  In addition to 
specifically requiring state parties to abolish any statute of limitations on 
war crimes,258 it states that the Convention applies directly  
to representatives of the State authority and private individuals 
who . . . participate in or who directly incite others to the 
commission of any of those crimes, or who conspire to commit 
them, irrespective of the degree of completion, and to 
 
testimony of a sixty-four-year-old grandmother witnessing the execution of half-Chinese 
infants). 
254.  See David Hawk’s numerous articles of refugee and defector testimony on the 
brutal treatment and executions of these infants.  DAVID HAWK, COMM. FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN N. KOREA, THE HIDDEN GULAG: THE LIVES AND VOICES OF “THOSE WHO ARE 
SENT TO THE MOUNTAINS” passim (2d ed. 2012), http://www.davidrhawk.com/HRNK_Hidde
nGulag2_Web_5-18.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W7CF-FVSC;DAVID HAWK, U.S COMM. 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN N. KOREA, THE HIDDEN GULAG: EXPOSING NORTH KOREA’S 
PRISON CAMPS passim (2003), http://www.davidrhawk.com/HiddenGulag.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7CKV-PM8V; see also KOREA INST. FOR NAT’L UNIFICATION, WHITE 
PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA 2011, at 513−20 (2011), http://www.kinu.or.kr
/eng/pub/pub_04_01.jsp?page=1&num=32&mode=view&field=&text=&order=&dir=&bid=
DATA04&ses=, archived at http://perma.cc/8MT2-YPDD. 
255.  See, e.g., Robert Park, North Korea and the Genocide Movement, HARV. INT’L 
REV. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://hir.harvard.edu/north-korea-and-the-genocide-movement, 
archived at http://perma.cc/A88E-2LTF; see also supra note 247 and sources cited therein.  
256.  War Crimes Convention, supra note 231, at pmbl. (“Recognizing that it is 
necessary and timely to affirm in international law, through this Convention, the principle 
that there is no period of limitation for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and to secure 
its universal application . . . . ”). 
257.  Id. art. 1. 
258.  Id. art. 4. 
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representatives of the State authority who tolerate their 
commission.259 
North Korea acceded to the convention on November 8, 1984,260 
effectively attributing culpability upon North Korea and directly 
exposing it to liability for war crimes and crimes against humanity for its 
numerous violations.  Regrettably, North Korea signs and ratifies 
treaties for tactical gain, not in good faith. 
C. Applicable Customary International Law 
Although the majority of the basis of customary international law in 
the field of armed conflict has been covered heretofore—North Korea 
having ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for example—a short 
analysis of two principles follows in this section: (1) directly attacking 
demilitarized zones that the parties agreed to forbid attacking, and (2) 
the use of chemical weapons. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross stands highly 
respected in the international community for its coverage, 
interpretation, and publications on international humanitarian law.  It 
has documented dozens of rules of customary international law in IHL, 
which are based on decades of use by nations and dozens of 
international agreements, cases, and domestic laws.261  This section 
demonstrates that North Korea, which has allegedly confirmed that it 
has not and will not break these two rules of customary international 
law presented above,262 has evinced every intention of ignoring such 
rules.  
Many scholars have noted that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 
their Protocols replaced many of the Hague Conventions and other 
former IHL treaties.263  As demonstrated above, the Geneva 
 
259.  Id. art. 2. 
260.  Accession to Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War 
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 8, 1984, 1379 U.N.T.S. 316 (entered into force 
Feb. 6, 1985). 
261.  See generally JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 
(2005) (providing the results of a study of the Red Cross regarding basic customary IHL 
Rules). 
262.  See supra note 260 and accompanying text; infra note 264 and accompanying text. 
263.  See, e.g., J. Ashley Roach, Certain Conventional Weapons Convention: Arms 
Control or Humanitarian Law?, 105 MIL. L. REV. 3, 35–36 (1984) (“The 1949 Conventions 
however ‘replace,’ ‘complement,’ or ‘supplement’ earlier Geneva and Hague Conventions in 
relations between powers who are bound by both.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Conventions stand in judgment over violations of IHL, like 
indiscriminate bombing of unaware and defenseless civilian towns and 
villages.264  The Red Cross’s rules on demilitarized zones and chemical 
weapons have a similar function.265  North Korea’s communication 
regarding its compliance with such rules counts as ludicrous. 
In 1989, North Korea made a statement claiming that the country 
would not test, produce, store, or introduce from the outside any nuclear 
or chemical weapons, nor would it allow passage of such weapons 
through its territory; it also claimed in 1995 to be opposed in principle to 
such weapons.266  However, the DPRK has tested, produced, and stored 
chemical weapons for many years in several locations around the North, 
some estimating that the nation has 2,500 to 5,000 metric tons of such 
weapons, such as phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, mustard gas, and sarin.267  
North Korea has tested its chemical weapons on concentration camp 
prisoners in violation of this customary rule or established IHL.268  
When South Korea provided over 610,000 gas masks to its citizens after 
the bombing of Yeonpyeong Island, it did so to guard against a chemical 
weapons attack.269 
 
264.  See, e.g., Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, 
arts. 1, 3, 5–6, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351 (entered into force Feb. 28, 1910) (prohibiting naval 
bombardment of various civilian targets). 
265.  HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 261, at 576, 600. 
266.  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Practice Relating to Rule 74. Chemical 
Weapons, INT’L COMM. FOR THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2
_cou_kp_rule74 (last visited May 27, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/FW8K-CWPP. 
267.  North Korea: Chemical, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, http://www.nti.org/countr
y-profiles/north-korea/chemical/ (last visited May 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/RA5C
-A9KD; see also DPRK: Chemical Weapons, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/n
uke/guide/dprk/facility/cw.htm (last visited May 27, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/YY6S-
VGQF (“North Korea has at least eight industrial facilities that can produce chemical agents, 
and probably nearly twice this many; however, the production rate and types of munitions are 
uncertain.”). 
268.  See several of the Hague conventions and other conventions regarding the 
prohibition of the use of poisons and asphyxiating gas in warfare: Convention Relating to the 
Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-Ships, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 319, 3 Martens 
Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 557 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910); Convention Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex art. 23, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 
(entered into force Feb. 28, 1910); Hague Declaration (IV, 2) Concerning the Prohibition of 
the Use of Projectiles Diffusing Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, 26 Martens Nouveau 
Recueil (ser. 2) 998, 187 Consol. T.S. 453 (entered into force Apr. 9, 1900); Hague 
Convention II, supra note 37, art. 23; INST. OF INT’L LAW, supra note 37, art. 8; Conference of 
Brussels, supra note 38, art. 13. 
269.  See North Korea: Chemical, supra note 267. 
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North Korea’s constantly breaks Rule 36 of these customary rules 
through its DMZ incursions.  In 1996, the DPRK made accusations to 
the president of the UN Security Council that the Republic of Korea 
had overstepped the bounds of the armistice by building up military 
forces in the DMZ; in turn, it claimed the armistice no longer bound it in 
relation to the DMZ.270  However, North Korea has breached the DMZ 
with infiltrators and armed attacks hundreds of times and for decades 
well-before this 1996 date, and hundreds of times thereafter.271  In sum, 
even if North Korea had not signed the many IHL treaties above, it 
would likely still have been liable for its hostilities in violating various 
principles of customary international law like these two presented here. 
D.  International Human Rights Law and IHL:  
Two Sides of the Same Coin 
As highlighted in the prior companion articles, North Korea has a 
terrible human rights record.272  Although many scholars tend to 
differentiate the fields of international human rights law (IHR) and 
IHL, this section will show that the two can fit together rather well, 
especially in characterizing North Korea’s violations of international law 
and future liability.  A few international courts have recognized this 
link, and their opinions tend to demonstrate that if North Korea’s 
leaders were to be indicted and prosecuted under IHL, human rights law 
would appropriately find itself part of the proceedings. 
One of the first courts to discuss the connection between these two 
major areas of international law was the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in 2004.  In the ICJ’s Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Palestinian Case) advisory 
opinion,273 the court explained that protections offered by IHR 
conventions do not stop operating during an armed conflict.274  
Derogation clauses, however, may apply.  The court said that although 
 
270.  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW: PRACTICE 697–98 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck 
eds., 2005). 
271.  See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
272.  See, e.g., Tan, A State of Rightlessness, supra note 253, at 682 (“Experts in the 
human rights field have averred that the human rights situation in North Korea is the worst in 
the world.”) (citing such experts). 
273.  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9). 
274.  Id. ¶ 106. 
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each of these areas of the law afford distinctive rights, areas of overlap 
also exist; accordingly, the court said it had to look at both to determine 
whether rights had been violated in the occupied territory of 
Palestine.275  For example, the court found that Article 2 of the Child 
Convention applied to the occupied territory in dispute, even though the 
events the court addressed transpired in the midst of an international 
armed conflict.276 
Additionally, other human rights courts have thought the same 
regarding applying IHL.  For example, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights in the case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia stated 
that it was necessary to analyze IHL principles to interpret the 
American Convention on Human Rights and find Colombia civilly 
liable for its paramilitary groups torturing and killing civilians in the 
town of Mapiripán.277  Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, in a separate 
opinion, not only agreed with this convergence of these areas of 
international law, he stated that the convergence clearly includes 
International Refugee Law as well.278  The UN Commission on Human 
Rights has clearly recognized this link, providing guidance for states on 
internal displacement of refugees.279 
The ICJ reaffirmed its commitment to utilizing both IHR and IHL 
when assessing civil liability of states in armed conflict.  In Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda),280 the court cited the Palestinian Case when finding 
that it should consider a number of IHR instruments and agreements in 
order to analyze whether the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) 
violated international law during the civil war in the Congo.281  After 
looking at both types of law, the court found that the UPDF had 
violated customary IHL (i.e., the Hague Regulations) and various 
principles of IHR law282 in its occupation of Ituri and fighting in 
 
275.  Id. 
276.  Id. ¶ 113. 
277.  Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, ¶ 115 (Sept. 15, 2005). 
278.  Id. ¶ 43 (opinion of Trindade, J.). 
279.  See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN 
AFFAIRS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT (2d ed. 2004),  http://www.br
ookings.edu/~/media/Projects/idp/GPEnglish.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q4GE-RVCZ. 
280.  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec. 19). 
281.  Id. ¶¶ 215–17. 
282.  Id. ¶ 219. 
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Kisangani by indiscriminately attacking civilians; killing, torturing, and 
inhumanely treating the Congolese civilian population; inciting ethnic 
conflict; and failing to take measures to put an end to the armed 
conflict.283 
Another example comes from the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights.  In a case regarding indiscriminate bombing during an 
internal conflict in Colombia,284 the commission provided an apropos 
quote in relation to North Korea and other states that abuse human 
rights in the midst of armed conflicts: 
The events of the present case are framed in the context of the 
internal armed conflict of Colombia, which does not exonerate 
the State from respecting and guaranteeing respect for basic 
human rights of individuals not directly involved, in accordance 
with the provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.  In this regard, the Commission considers that the 
State has general and special duties to protect the civilian 
population under its care, derived from international 
humanitarian law.285 
These opinions demonstrate that if North Korea’s leaders came 
before a tribunal or if North Korea as a nation-state stood before an 
international court, its human rights violations would substantially 
supplement its liability.  This nexus should wax clearer in the following 
section. 
E. Applicable Case Law and UN Security Council Resolutions  
In addition to the above case law regarding the application of IHL 
during armed conflict in the Korean context, ample case precedents 
from various international courts demonstrate that North Korea and its 
leaders could find themselves prosecuted for their continued hostilities 
and human rights abuses during the ongoing Korean conflict.  North 
Korea’s genocidal tendencies toward Christians and Chinese (and even 
partially Chinese) children have generated grave concerns.286  
 
283.  Id. ¶ 220. 
284.  Lopez v. Colombia, Case 12.573, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 64/11, ¶ 240 
(2011). 
285.  Id. ¶ 215 (footnote omitted). 
286.  See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text.  
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Genocide, a jus cogens norm, can yield even more serious 
consequences.287  For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) has concluded that, at least under the ICTR’s statute, 
incitement to commit genocide does not have to be public or even 
successful.288  Specifically, the ICTR has stated that merely preventing 
births of an ethnic group, what North Korea has clearly done, qualifies 
as genocide.289  In fact, the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has found that any act committed with 
intent to destroy a group in whole or part constitutes an act of 
genocide.290  North Korea’s leaders should take heed because the ICTY 
(prosecuting former President Milosevic) and the ICTR (by convicting 
the former Prime Minister of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda, for genocide, 
ordering a life sentence) have asserted that heads of government have 
no immunity from any criminal liability for genocidal acts.291 
The DPRK should think twice before engaging in torture of POWs, 
like those from the USS Pueblo, or its own people.292  As the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has pointed out, torture rises to the 
level of a ius cogens violation (or at least customary international law), 
 
287.  See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Judgment, ¶ 417 (June 1, 
2001), available at http://www.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/appeals
-chamber-judgements/en/010601.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H492-Z8ZG (“Akayesu was 
individually responsible, under Article 6(1) of the Statute, for genocide, direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity, all extremely serious crimes.”). 
288.  Id. ¶¶ 482–83; see also Jose E. Alvarez, Lessons from the Akayesu Judgment, 5 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 359, 361 (1999) (“[T]he judges elaborate the controversial offense 
of incitement to genocide.  They find that incitement need not be direct but can be implicit.”). 
289.  Alvarez, supra note 288, at 362 (“The Akayesu judges note that, ‘in patriarchal 
societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the father, an 
example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case where, during 
rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, with 
the intent to have her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother’s 
group.’” (quoting Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 507 (Sept. 2, 
1998))). 
290.  Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 220 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004). 
291.  See generally Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, International Humanitarian Law from 
Nuremberg to Rome: The Weighty Precedents of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, 14 PACE INT’L L. REV. 273, 289-93, 301 (2002) (discussing the ICTR case of 
Prosecutor v. Kambanda in which Kambanda was convicted on all counts indicted against 
him, including genocide). 
292.  See supra notes 168–72 and accompanying text; see also Tan, A State of 
Rightlessness, supra note 253, at 704–07 (giving a few examples of the horrific torture 
procedures used against its own civilians in the various concentration camps throughout the 
North). 
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and its prohibition does not cease during wartime.293  In addition, North 
Korea should desist from rape, as the ICTY has pointed out that rape 
can qualify as a form of torture.294  The Rome Statute, the constitutive 
treaty of the International Criminal Court, also counts rape as a crime 
against humanity.295 
North Korea’s military hostilities raise further concerns.  Courts like 
the European Court of Human Rights have found nations civilly liable 
for IHL violations like indiscriminate bombing and killing of civilians.296  
Such bombings can violate the right to life under IHR law as well.297  In 
other words, North Korea may incur legal culpability for shelling areas 
like Yeonpyeong Island.   
Moreover, the DPRK must take note that even the well-known 
defense of merely “following orders” does not immunize its military and 
civilian personnel for IHL and IHR law transgressions, although it may 
mitigate culpability.298  So long as any accused exercised effective 
control over his or her subordinates when a crime was committed (i.e., 
 
293.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Peru, Case 11.157, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
67/11, ¶ 172 & n.158 (2011) (citing numerous Inter-American Court of Human Rights cases 
stating this principle). 
294.  Alvarez, supra note 288, at 362 (“For this purpose, the judges affirm that rape 
when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity constitutes torture.”) (citing Akayesu, 
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment). 
295.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 (expressly including “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” 
under subsection (g) of Article 7, the article that lists the terms included in the phrase “crimes 
against humanity” as defined by the court). 
296.  E.g., Esmukhambetov v. Russia, App. No. 23445/03, ¶¶ 150–51 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
2011) (“In sum, the Court considers that the indiscriminate bombing of a village inhabited by 
civilians—women and children being among their number—was manifestly disproportionate 
to the achievement of the purpose under Article 2 § 2 (a) invoked by the Government. . . .  
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention on that account.”); 
Isayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 & 57949/00, ¶¶ 199–200 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005) 
(“To sum up, even assuming that that the military were pursuing a legitimate aim in launching 
12 S-24 non-guided air-to-ground missiles on 29 October 1999, the Court does not accept that 
the operation near the village of Shaami-Yurt was planned and executed with the requisite 
care for the lives of the civilian population.  The Court finds that there has been a violation of 
Article 2 of the Convention in respect of the responding State’s obligation to protect the right 
to life of the three applicants and of the two children of the first applicant, Ilona Isayeva and 
Said-Magomed Isayev.”). 
297.  See supra notes 286–91 and cases cited therein.  
298.  See Matthew Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Uncertain Contours of Command 
Responsibility, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2001) (discussing numerous ICTY and ICTR 
cases that convicted defendants based on command responsibility).  
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de jure or de facto control), he or she can also be criminally liable for 
said crime.299  It is “the failure of an official to fulfill his obligation to 
prevent or to punish criminal conduct” that incurs liability to everyone 
in the chain for the crimes committed.300  Much of North Korea’s 
military and governmental elite remain vulnerable in regards to IHL 
and IHR atrocities against their own people as well as those of other 
nations. 
The International Criminal Court (ICC), after I urged the 
Prosecutor to do so, has commenced investigation of some of the 
DPRK’s most recent hostilities against South Korea under the auspices 
of the Rome Statute.301  The Office of the Prosecutor has been 
investigating whether it can charge DPRK nationals for war crimes 
regarding their sinking of the Cheonan and their shelling of 
Yeonpyeong Island.302  North Korea’s concern should arise from the fact 
that the ICC has jurisdiction under the Rome Statute to investigate and 
issue indictments for these incidents because South Korea remains a 
party to the Rome Statute and such acts concluded on South Korean 
territory.303  Noting the in absentia indictment by the ICC of President 
Omar al-Bashir of Sudan,304 who has never appeared before the Court, 
North Korea’s leaders may fall within the ICC’s grasp as well.  The 
DPRK should remain cognizant of this risk, considering that the 
prosecutor has been trying in vain to receive a response from the 
country for investigative purposes over the past several years.305  The 
ICC remains open to a possible referral, although it has discontinued its 
pursuit of a prosecution based on the Cheonan sinking and the shelling 
of Yeonpyeong Island. 
 
299.  E.g., Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 84–85 (May 
23, 2005). 
300.  Lippman, supra note 298, at 72.  
301.  OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL CT., REPORT ON PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATION ACTIVITIES 2012, at 15 (2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C433C462
-7C4E-4358-8A72-8D99FD00E8CD/285209/OTP2012ReportonPreliminaryExaminations22N
ov2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FY8X-D8Y2. 
302.  Id. 
303.  See id. 
304.  E.g., Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC Prosecutor 
Presents Case Against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad AL BASHIR, for Genocide, 
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes in Darfur, PR341 (July 14, 2008), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20(2008)/
Pages/a.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/P2HT-C7RR.  
305.  See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, supra note 301, at 15.  
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The UN Security Council could pursue further action against North 
Korea in the near future.  The DPRK has been violating the Council’s 
resolutions involving various restrictions on North Korea’s activities, 
especially regarding nuclear proliferation, for a number of years now,306 
and it should take heed for at least several reasons.  First, it should bear 
in mind that the Security Council assembled the original military 
coalition forces to repel North Korea’s attack of the South in 1950 and 
remains technically in control of such forces, with the armistice the 
primary agreement in place and the peninsula still at war.307  Second, 
under the same Chapter VII powers that the Council used to assemble 
these forces, the Council can carry out other military actions to restore 
international peace and security if North Korea’s hostilities and threats 
continue in the region.308  Thirdly, the Council can continue to cripple 
North Korea in other respects through additional sanctions that could 
contribute to its collapse.309  Additionally, China’s support for North 
Korea has waned, as seen with its involvement in the drafting of the 
latest resolution; China’s support for further action against North Korea 
could deliver a large blow to the DPRK—as China remains its biggest 
lifeline.310  China has the potential to exert more influence over the 
DPRK than any other nation—if it chooses to do so.  Moreover, in light 
of these developments, the UN Human Rights Council recently created 
the UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korea; the Council held its 
first official meeting on July 5, 2013, in Geneva and plans to look more 
 
306.  See supra note 125 for the language of the latest Security Council resolution 
condemning North Korea’s repeated violations of the Council’s relevant resolution.  
307.  See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
308.  See U.N. Charter arts. 39–51 (composing the articles of Chapter VII titled “Action 
with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression” 
(capitalization omitted)). 
309.  See, e.g., id. art. 41 (“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving 
the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon 
the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.  These may include complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” (emphasis added)). 
310.  As mentioned above, China had a hand in drafting the latest Security Council 
resolution against North Korea’s third nuclear test, even though it has been the biggest 
supporter of North Korea since the fall of the Soviet Union.  Lederer & Kim, supra note 7; 
see also INT’L CRISIS GRP., CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: COMRADES FOREVER? 1 (2006), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/north-korea/112_china_and_nor
th_korea_comrades_forever.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M96E-8S7G (providing one 
overview of China’s continuous support to North Korea since the early 1990s). 
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in-depth at the internal human rights situation in the North.311  This 
Commission serves to more widely disseminate knowledge about North 
Korea’s crimes and may also serve as a springboard for further action.   
North Korea must remember that disobeying these various Security 
Council resolutions violates international law and could lead to any one 
of the three aforementioned actions by the Council (which it has done 
several times in the past).  For example, North Korea recently 
threatened to restart its nuclear facilities in direct violation of the latest 
Security Council resolution,312 moved a long-range missile to its east 
coast,313 and refused to allow South Korean workers into its industrial 
zone to work.314  In looking at all angles of the issues and the recent, 
harshly worded Security Council resolution,315 even miscues or 
miscalculations could quickly escalate into a conflagration.316  
Consistently with its pattern of brinkmanship, nearly two months after 
its initial threat to reopen its nuclear facilities, North Korea approached 
the United States to resume talks.317 
F. Forum and Jurisdiction  
The most recent companion article to this one analyzed the best 
forum for a prosecution of North Korean officials for IHR and other 
 
311.  UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korea Begins Operations, UN OFFICE OF THE 
HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Jul. 5, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pa
ges/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13508&LangID=E, archived at http://perma.cc/A4ED-
5CVM. 
312.  S.C. Res. 2094, supra note 7, ¶ 6; Hyung-Jin Kim & Foster Klug, North Korea 
Vows to Restart Nuclear Facilities, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 2, 2013), http://old.seattletimes.com/
text/2020684508.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PMM3-3M7C. 
313.  Sam King & Hyung-Jin Kim, S Korea: North Korea Moved Missile to East Coast, 
L.A. SENTINEL (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.lasentinel.net/index.php?option=com_content&vie
w=article&id=10816:skorea-north-korea-moved-missile-to-east-coast&catid=78&Itemid=168, 
archived at http://perma.cc/X8KM-5NFL. 
314.  Kim Yong-Ho & Ahn Young-Joon, N. Korea Refuses to Let S. Koreans Enter Joint 
Factory, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_2293476
0/n-korea-refuses-let-s-koreans-enter-joint, archived at http://perma.cc/2K8F-HKGN. 
315.  S.C. Res. 2094, supra note 7, ¶ 1 (“Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear 
test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 (local time) in violation and flagrant 
disregard of the Council’s relevant resolutions . . . .”). 
316.  Interview with Young-jin Choi, Ambassador of the Republic of Kor. to the U.S., in 
Wash., D.C. (April 5, 2013). 
317.  Jean H. Lee, North Korea Changes Tack and Tells U.S.: Let’s Talk, USA TODAY 
(June 16, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/06/15/nkorea-proposes-nucl
ear-talks/2427457/, archived at http://perma.cc/CF2Z-DN76. 
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violations, ideally after the reunification of the Korean peninsula.318  In 
addition to the possibility of a hybrid tribunal redressing certain 
international crimes after North Korea’s disintegration,319 this section 
will briefly delve into the forum options and other redress options 
available specifically for violations of IHL without the necessity of 
reunification.   
The ICC can indict North Korean leaders for their crimes and try 
them individually.320  Under Article 25, individuals can face criminal 
culpability for their actions, and they may have to pay reparations to 
victims of their crimes under Article 75.321 
Additionally, the Geneva Conventions provide a means of chastising 
violations.  Under Article 132 of Geneva Convention III, a party to the 
conflict can inquire whether there have been transgressions of the 
Convention and work to put an immediate end to them.322  Article 149 
of Geneva Convention IV provides for the same.323  Under Article 91 of 
Protocol I, any party to the conflict that violates the Conventions can be 
liable to pay compensation for such violations.324  Additionally, 
international criminal tribunals use the Geneva Conventions and its 
Protocols to find individuals criminally liable for violations.325 
A similar paradigm exists with the Genocide Convention.  Under 
Article VIII, any party to that convention can call upon UN organs to 
take any action necessary under the UN Charter to prevent or suppress 
acts of genocide.326  This means that states can call for action through a 
body like the Security Council to stop the genocide in North Korea by 
any means necessary without an objection by the DPRK—a signatory to 
 
318.  See, e.g., Tan, Finding a Forum, supra note 12, at 771–72. 
319.  See id. at 809–11. 
320.  See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 295, art. 25; Tan, 
Finding a Forum, supra note 12, at 777. 
321.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 295, art. 25; id. 
art. 75 (“The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying 
appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation.”). 
322.  Geneva Convention III, supra note 157, art. 132. 
323.  Geneva Convention IV, supra note 158, art. 149. 
324.  Geneva Protocol I, supra note 74, art. 91. 
325.  E.g., Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-A, Judgment, ¶ 117 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 3, 2006) (stating that the ICTY Statute gave the tribunal 
the jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949). 
326.  Genocide Convention, supra note 230, art. 8. 
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the treaty.327  The Biological Weapons Convention gives similar powers 
to the UN Security Council to investigate alleged violations via 
complaints of state parties, but it contains weaker language and delves 
less deeply regarding the enumerated powers of the Council as a UN 
organ.328  These conventions have found individuals of state parties 
criminally liable.329 
North Korea must also keep in mind the concept of universal 
jurisdiction.  Certain egregious crimes rise to the level of jus cogens 
violations and can be redressed anywhere in the world with certain 
limits.330  Many of these (such as war crimes, genocide, and torture) have 
been addressed above, and individuals may be subject to this jurisdiction 
when any one of the following crimes has been committed: piracy, 
slavery, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, apartheid, and 
torture.331  Additionally, other crimes—such as hijacking airplanes, 
taking hostages, kidnapping, harming diplomatic agents, and forced 
disappearances, crimes that North Korea has committed as shown 
above—also coincide with universal jurisdiction.332  No separate 
criminal tribunal needs to award jurisdiction for some of the most 
heinous crimes if any nation has an interest in the crime and wants to 
prosecute North Korean individuals.333  However, nations have 
exercised universal jurisdiction very sparingly—it remains very delicate 
and sensitive politically.334  Belgium, for example, is a nation that has 
 
327.  See id. 
328.  Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 215, art. VI. 
329.  See, e.g., Press Release, U.N. Int’l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Radislav Krstic Becomes the First Person to Be Convicted of Genocide at the ICTY and Is 
Sentenced to 46 Years Imprisonment, UN Press Release OF/P.I.S./609e (Aug. 2, 2001), 
http://www.icty.org/sid/7964, archived at http://perma.cc/25JB-S5W7 (stating that Article 5 of 
the ICTY Statute defined Genocide exactly the same as the Genocide Convention, which was 
used to convict Radislav Krstic of genocide on August 2, 2001). 
330.  E.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: 
Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 106 (2001). 
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332.  See id. 
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perpetrator’s nationality, the victim’s nationality, and the enforcing state.  The basis is, 
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the application of that paradigm to the leaders, culture and citizens of North Korea.  The 
prior companion article addressed that subject in relation to formal international redress.  See 
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ventured to use it more than others, but it too has pulled back due to 
backlash.335 
V. CONCLUSION 
As seen from the continued hostilities on the Korean Peninsula and 
the increased tension between the DPRK and the rest of the world, the 
Korean conflict has not yet ended.  North Korea has admitted that fact 
on more than one occasion with its many agreements with South Korea 
and other interested nations.  With this continuous armed conflict come 
consequences and the application of certain international rules.  
International law, in its cases precedent, conventions, and customary 
rules, clearly provides the notion that the laws of international armed 
conflict still apply on the Korean peninsula. 
A law-abiding nation could remain insouciant about these laws; 
North Korea, on the other hand, has egregiously defied these rules in 
nearly every turn of the conflict.  Every infiltration of the DMZ, every 
plane hijacking, every murder and assassination, every kidnapping, 
every tortured POW, and every illegal weapon speak to North Korea’s 
liability under this law.  It is the hope of this Article that one day in the 
near future the leaders of North Korea will come to understand that 
they cannot hide their numerous violations of international law.  For the 
sake of the DPRK’s many victims, it is my wish that its attempts to 
mask, obfuscate, and distract from their heinous violations of 
international law will prove futile: justice demands it.  A just peace must 
replace the ongoing war between the Koreas as well as the lesser known 
war North Korea wages against its own people. 
 
335.  Bassiouni, supra note 330, at 145; Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, 
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